Heidegger on Anthropology

Zeljko LOPARIC
State University of Campinas (Unicamp), Brazil
President of the Brazilian Phenomenological Society
President of the Brazilian Society for Winnicottian Psychoanalysis

ABSTRACT: Based on Sein und Zeit (1927) and on Zollikoner Seminare (1987), the present essay reconstructs some aspects of Heidegger’s proposal for a scientific anthropology as a general framework for the development of a science of healthy human beings as well as for the Daseinsanalytic account of human pathology and therapy. Thomas Kuhn’s concept of paradigm is used as a guiding idea in reconstructing Heidegger’s, scattered and unsystematic remarks.

I. Heidegger on Philosophical and Scientific Anthropologies in Sein und Zeit
Heidegger has often been interpreted as the decided critic of any philosophical anthropology and, therefore, of any and every science of man (see Fahrenbach 1970). This is certainly unobjectionable if philosophical anthropology is based upon traditional ontology, which treats the human beings as belonging to a region of entities merely present (vorhanden) in the world, and if the science of man is seen as a branch of natural science. This also appears
to hold in the context of Heidegger’s late thought, which leaves little room for a non-objectifying and still scientific way of thinking and talking about man. Indeed, Heidegger presents himself in many late texts as an outright opponent not only of modern science, but also of scientific thinking in general.

In *Sein und Zeit*, however, Heidegger makes some very specific remarks about the foundations of a philosophy and science that arises from authentic human existence. There is a place also for the philosophical as well as scientific study of man, i.e., for the philosophical and the scientific anthropology. The same position is defended in the seminars that Heidegger conducted in Zollikon during the 1960s and in conversations with Medard Boss, which were made available in *Zollikoner Seminare* (1987).

My task in this paper is not to find a possible unity in Heidegger’s views on anthropology. Rather, I shall restrict myself to explaining what he says on this the subject in the two books mentioned. My main reason is the following: I think that Heidegger’s tenets there, even if taken only as provisional steps, are still important for the elaboration of a philosophy of a general science of man as well as of special human and social sciences, e.g., psychoanalysis.

*Philosophical* anthropology is conceived in *Sein und Zeit* as an a priori (transcendental) discipline based upon the results of the existential analytic of the structure of Dasein, i.e., upon the fundamental ontology (1927, p. 13). Some not inessential fragments of this discipline can be found, Heidegger says, in this text itself. However, since the analytic of Dasein is wholly oriented towards the guiding task of working out the question of Being, “it does not provide a complete ontology of Dasein.” This discipline, however, is something that “assuredly must be constructed if anything like a ‘philosophical’ anthropology is to have a philosophically adequate basis” (p. 17). In other words, in Heidegger’s view, the true philosophical anthropology is the same as the fundamental ontology developed
into a complete ontology of Dasein. To that effect, the task of working out and answering the question of Being must be expanded to comprehend that of “working out fully the existential a priori” (p. 131), which could thereafter be used as the foundational part of philosophical and scientific anthropologies (p. 200; cf. p. 183).

In keeping with the general outlook of philosophical disciplines favored by Heidegger, it is to be expected that the existentially based philosophical anthropology would have a general part and be further divided into various regional philosophical anthropologies, such as the philosophical psychology, ethics, politics, poetry, biography, historiography, ethnology and so on (pp. 16 and 51). All of these presuppose, as noted, a sufficiently developed analytic of Dasein as guideline (p. 51). Heidegger admits—and this a very important point from the methodological point of view—that positive sciences neither can nor should wait for the ontological labors of philosophy, either general or regional, to be done, and that they proceed by taking into account the everyday pre-ontological understanding of man. Further philosophical research will therefore “not take place as an ‘advance’ but will be accomplished by recapitulating what has already been ontically discovered, and by purifying in it a way that is ontologically more transparent” (p. 51).

The division of philosophical anthropology into general and regional parts requires the corresponding distinction between the topics treated, i.e., between the general ontological phenomena (in particular those involved in man’s relation to Being) and regional ontological phenomena (conditions of possibility of specific modes of being-in-the-world). In 1927, these distinctions were only outlined but not actually developed. Heidegger makes it clear, however, that all regional ontological phenomena have a basic historic structure (p. 20). Historicity and the corresponding temporality are not only the foundation of the understanding of Being, but are also the ground of all other basic or derived existentials.
There are some general methodological characteristics of any adequately established philosophical anthropology that follow from these considerations. The first two are negative, the other three are positive. Firstly, a true philosophical anthropology should not objectify human beings. The structure of man’s existence cannot be thematized as an object at hand or as merely present. Humans live in places and have originally to do with things that are not objectifiable entities either. In a note to the p. 363 of *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger leaves open the question whether “each science and even philosophical knowledge aims at presentification,” i.e., at objectification. I believe that his ultimate answer must be “no.” Secondly, an adequate projected philosophical anthropology should not be constructive. This means that it is prohibited to proceed by framing and testing theoretical hypotheses or suppositions, in other words, by the hypothetic-deductive method. Thirdly, it must be phenomenological or descriptive, in the same sense as Heidegger’s fundamental ontology (existential analytic of the human understanding of Being) is descriptive. Fourthly, these descriptions are to be hermeneutic or interpretative. That means that ontological anthropological phenomena must be seen within the horizon of sense and meaning that in the last instance is the horizon of the original finite time. Therefore, the philosophical anthropology must be a historical science that takes into account the temporal dimension of the meaning of ontological phenomena.

Now, any acceptable scientific or ontic anthropology or science of man must, of course, be grounded in the philosophic anthropology, that is, on the completely developed ontology of Dasein. It seems that Heidegger has in view, on the one hand, a general scientific anthropology founded on the general philosophical anthropology and, on the other hand, various special factual sciences of man (history, psychology, psychiatry, psychopathology etc.), each
of which is based on the corresponding regional philosophical anthropology (p. 16; cf. p. 63).

Just as Heidegger’s philosophic anthropology, his ontic, general as well as special, anthropology implies the idea of a difference between, on the one hand, ontic phenomena (concrete modes of being themselves) and, on the other hand, ontological phenomena—general or regional conditions of possibility of specific modes of being. The relation between these two kinds of phenomena is that of determination, which, however, has a very specific meaning. Ontological phenomena “determine” ontic ones in the sense that they make them visible. By so doing, they hide themselves in the ontic phenomena. Nevertheless, the ontological phenomena are visible to an eye educated in philosophical hermeneutics. Indeed, the ontological phenomena are the essential contents, more precisely, the a priori part of the whole content of an ontic factum. The model to think this are Kant’s pure intuitions of space and time. They are conditions of possibility, i.e., of visibility, of phenomenal objects and, at the same time, they are themselves “pure intuitions.” Heidegger also speaks of the foundational relation between the ontological and the ontic levels. Here again, the term “foundation” used has a very special way. It does not refer to causation, nor to the establishment of a firm ground, but to an essentially finite project produced in the circle of finite time, i.e., to an a priori opening negated from the very beginning by its opposite: the a priori closure, the end of time, the absence of meaning. From these tenets some important methodological consequences follow for any possible ontic anthropology.

All scientific anthropologies must satisfy two negative a priori features: they should neither be objectifying nor constructive, i.e., should not make human beings into objects nor should they resort to freely floating suppositions, as natural sciences do. On the other hand, they must be descriptive in the sense of bringing to language the
self-revealing human phenomena (1927, p. 28). In addition, all are to be developed by *hermeneutic* or *interpretative* method (pp. 38 and 398). Finally, not only the original hermeneutic self-understanding, but a hermeneutic methodology derived from it has to display the temporal meaning of phenomena (ibid.). Heidegger is not specific about this methodology nor about the mode of its derivation. He hopes that the future progress in this direction could be essentially favored by the reception of the work done by Dilthey. The basic ecstatic character of the human beings is to be taken into account.

Indeed, the “thematization” of anthropological matters conducted within the framework of a complete ontology of Dasein cannot possibly have the meaning of a simple “presentification” (*Gegenwärtigung*). Human life is not a natural process occurring in the linear time, but a “historic” happening, taking place in the opening of a circular time that is the finite horizon of manifestations of human beings and that includes, besides the situational present, the factual past and the existential or ecstatic future. The modes of being of Dasein have to be viewed as examples of the circularity of original time. The facts studied is any particular ontic science of man are not to be seen as examples of a supra-temporal general pattern, expressed in natural laws, but of instances of non-linear existential and temporal structure (1927, p. 395) revealed by an “a priori ontological ‘generalization’” (1927, p. 199). Agreeing with Dilthey, Heidegger says that the “object” of the sciences of man is “‘life’ in the context of its historic development and effectuation” (1927, p. 398). Therefore, all human sciences about the human being conceived in the light of existential analytic and philosophical (phenomenological) general or regional anthropologies that are themselves *historical*: “If the being of Dasein is fundamentally historical, than it is patent that every factual science *is concerned by this becoming*” (1927, p. 392, my italics).
Summing up, according to Heidegger’s project, the ontic anthropologies must be elaborated as interpretive (hermeneutical), descriptive and historical sciences.

**II. Heidegger’s Criticism of Modern Natural Science in the Zollikoner Seminare**

The point of view of *Sein und Zeit* is further developed in *Zollikoner Seminare* (1959-69). There, he follows two lines of thought. On one hand, he proposes a critical analysis of theory construction in modern natural sciences. I speak of criticism because we do not have a full-fledged deconstruction: natural sciences are not actually traced back to their ontological origin either in the modes of being-in-the-world or in the history of being. An account of this criticism is given in Loparic 1999, section 2. On the other hand, he makes more explicit the framework of ontic anthropologies outlined in 1927. In the present section I shall examine the first point.

A natural scientific theory in the modern sense, he says, “is a constructive assumption to the end of a consistent and continuous ordering of a fact in a greater context, namely, in the pre-existing whole of nature.” Neither here nor indeed anywhere else in the seminars is Heidegger very specific about the nature of “consistent and continuous ordering” of facts. Yet he has more to say about other elements of this definition. One of them is the constructive aspect of modern scientific theories. These constructions are dealt with on two levels. On a higher level, constructions have the meaning of metaphysical projects of nature. The basic constructive metaphysical model of natural sciences is the Newtonian project of nature as a “space-temporal system of mass points in movement” (p. 198). It is against the background of such a metaphysical theory of the essence of nature that specific natural sciences construe their own suppositions. These metaphysical and lower level scientific hypotheses are
in turn the basis of observation and description of facts as well as of experiments with facts. It follows that scientific facts are always theory-dependent and theory-laden (p. 328, 168). In particular, there are no metaphysically free facts. Indeed, there are no “pure facts.” (Cf. Goethe: “The highest thing to understand would be: everything factual is already theoretical” (p. 328).) Therefore, when making descriptions we have always to take into account some theory.

Newton’s metaphysics of nature is itself founded upon still higher level “suppositions.” Among these a very important role is played by the Kantian “transcendental supposition of objectivity of objects” (p. 169). The central historical place of the theory of objectification of the world is indeed Kant’s critique of pure reason, in particular his thesis that the conditions of possibility of experience are at the same time conditions of possibility of objects of experience (p. 140). This point was made also in Heidegger 1957. (Note that Kant would disagree with calling his theory of objectivity (transcendental analytic of the understanding) a “supposition.” Heidegger himself, particularly, in his second period took a different view of the matter: Kant’s theory of objectivity is not a human project at all but a sending of the being.)

Other very important constructs are the (transcendental) principle of causality (p. 28), which itself is founded upon the principle of sufficient reason, enunciated by Leibniz (pp. 28 and 267), and the transcendental principle of measurability of objects and of their properties (p. 119). Measurability, says Heidegger, belongs to the thing interpreted ontologically as an object (p. 128). In other texts, Heidegger quotes Max Planck who says that, in science to be manes to be measurable, cf. 1954, p. 58. Measurability in turn means calculability (p. 135). Both suppositions are necessary conditions of the production of objects (p. 128) and in that sense of our control and steering of nature (p. 136). Therefore, Heidegger can say that the paradigmatic form of modern natural science is cybernetics (p. 25).
The Newtonian mechanical and dynamic model of nature taken together with Leibnizian and Kantian general metaphysics is the general a priori constructive framework (p. 165) to which natural sciences add specific hypotheses, fictions (p. 160, 165) or myths (p. 218) of their own. Among these additional constructions, a special importance is attributed to certain so-called fundamental forces, special types of cause, to the idea of machine, that is, of mechanical organization of things, including man, along with many low-level and less general causal hypotheses to be tested by experiments.

This way of constituting the domain of the modern sciences and their theories implies a specific way of viewing language and method. The language used is conceived as conveying measurable, calculable information about objective matters of fact and about being itself a calculable object (p. 119). As to method, it is the hypothetic-deductive and experimental method (p. 166-67).

Finally, there is the question of how to evaluate the results of problems and scientific research guided by this paradigm. From a cognitive point of view, the results obtained by the two methods are fictional to the same degree in which theoretical suppositions that make them possible are fictional (p. 167). As to the relevance of these results, they are generally praised for being useful. As a matter of fact, the knowledge produced by natural sciences in our epoch does not lead to any better future, nor still less to the liberation of man, but rather to his unlimited self-destruction (p. 123, 160).

This is a brief summary of Heidegger’s views of factual or so called “empirical” sciences put forward in the Zollikoner Seminare. Although critical, it does not imply pure and simple suppression of science. That would not be possible, firstly, because science is and remains an existential possibility of man and, secondly, because of the role of the natural sciences in contemporary life. Indeed, for Heidegger, the modern natural science is a derived mode of being-in-the-world (p. 122).
His main point is not that natural sciences are to be torn down, but that the paradigm of natural science is not to be made exclusive (p. 143, 160). The main reason is not so much that by so proceeding human scientists falsify the mode of being of man, it is rather the following: “social” scientists who work within the natural science paradigm contribute to produce a power that puts in extreme danger not only concrete existing men but even more importantly the essence of man, that which makes it possible for men to be themselves and free. The late Heidegger has much to say about the extreme danger for the very essence of man of the meaning of being that prevails in the epoch of technology. In the Seminars this word seems to have been used more loosely.

III. Heidegger’s Project of a Scientific Anthropology in the Zollikoner Seminare

Heidegger’s views on scientific anthropology presented in Sein und Zeit have been developed further in Zollikoner Seminare (1959-69). At the same time that he proposes a general critical view of natural sciences as outlined above, he also makes more explicit his ontological framework of ontic anthropologies. In the present section we shall examine this second point.

Heidegger’s views of factual sciences put forward in the Zollikon seminars were met with two severe objections by some participants in the seminars. Firstly, there is the objection of hostility. It says that the existential analytic is hostile to science, to objects ant to concepts (p. 147). Secondly, there is the objection of methodological inadequacy: Heidegger seems to have an “old-fashioned view of the method of natural sciences” (p. 343). It was also felt as disturbing that Heidegger did not appreciate the benefits of scientific research (p. 329).
In order to meet these objections, Heidegger tried to make explicit his own requirements for a possible science of man (*Wissenschaft vom Menschen*) that would be adequate to its object. (Note that in *Zollikoner Seminare*, Heidegger does not speak any more of “*Geisteswissenschaften.*”) He recognizes that traditional psychiatry and psychopathology and in general all factual anthropological disciplines were developed within this framework of sciences of nature. That is why Heidegger calls his anthropology an “entirely new” and “differently articulated” science (1987, p. 179) to be developed in the future. By elaborating his project, he hoped to keep open the possibility this time of developing a science with the evident ontological background of these phenomena revealed by phenomenological ontologies, both general and regional, not with naturalistic and in the end metaphysical presuppositions.

A scientific anthropology, says Heidegger, can be viewed as “the whole of a possible discipline devoted to the task to produce a connected presentation of demonstrable ontic phenomena of social-historic and individual Dasein” (1987, p. 163-64). As with any science, the daseinsanalytic anthropology should consist in “a systematic ordering.” This ordering implies making classifications and considering human existence in modern industrial societies (p. 164).

In order to show how this definition compares with contemporary views on factual science I shall use Thomas S. Kuhn’s concept of paradigm. (The idea that Heidegger’s view of science can be approximated to the Kuhnian was already defended by some other authors, cf. Vietta 1989, p. 26.) The advantage of this procedure is not only that of putting order into Heidegger’s rather scattered additional remarks, but also that of allowing further comparisons with other contemporary projects and realizations of the science of man. (I have proposed such a comparative study in Loparic 1999b.) According to Kuhn, an empirical science is characterized by a disciplinary matrix and by shared solutions of paradigmatic problems. The disciplinary
matrix of an empirical science consists of following items: (1) leading generalizations, (As he was working mainly with physics, Kuhn speaks of “symbolic generalizations.” What he wants to discuss are generalizations that determine broad traits of the subject matter and are commonly called natural laws or definitions. My expression “leading generalization” tries to preserve the moment of generality without implying the formalization or naturalization.); (2) metaphysical model of the domain of research; (3) heuristic rules (I am making two items out of one item in Kuhn’s original proposal, distinguishing more sharply between ontology and heuristics.); and (4) shared scientific values, including the shared conception of science.

This said, let me try to find out what and how Heidegger’s proposal of a daseinsanalytic anthropology sketched in the Zollikon Seminars can contribute to the development of the disciplinary matrix of a future scientific anthropology. The stress should be on “future,” since there are good reasons to think that despite pioneering efforts of Binswanger, Boss, and others, Heidegger’s ideas are far from having been articulated as the paradigm of an identifiable scientific community. (See Boss 1975. For my views on this issue, cf. Loparic 2002.)

IV. Heidegger on Leading Generalizations in Scientific Anthropology

Let us start with leading generalizations. Since Heidegger deals with the factual science of man as such, he cannot adopt any particular generalization as being the leading one. On the negative side, he does not accept that the ordering of phenomena could be expressed in terms of mathematical formulas or of natural laws taken in the sense of deterministic rules of human modes of being-in-the-world. On the positive side, in ordering experiences in a
science of man one has to see ontic phenomena in the light of the ontological ones. But that is not enough. It is essential that facts be seen in relation to the concrete individual, i.e., as constituting a living motivational whole together with other ontic phenomena. Here, phenomena are not related to each other as conditions of possibility, but as motivating and motivated facts. In order to see a behavior as a manifestation of Dasein, we have to do more than just identify its ontological structure, we have to clarify for what motives or reasons and how it comes to happen, that is, we have to see how it fits to the life structure, to the motivational context of the individual person under study or care (p. 29).

That is why we cannot get rid of genetic explanations and why they appear self-evident and necessary to us (p. 266). People indeed do make decisions and act according to motivational patterns established in everyday life. These patterns are not expressions of any eternal laws. Nevertheless, there is a meaning to be given to “always” in human matters. It is the “‘always’ which is a consequence of the essence” (p. 197). Not a necessary or causal consequence, but still a usually happening and commonly observed one. Thus, in order to understand one person’s motivations, we need an ontic anthropology of motivational contexts developed to the degree to allow us to propose genetic explanations.

In a letter to Binswanger from May 1947, Heidegger makes an illuminating remark about the nature of daseinsanalytic “laws.” The hermeneutic exploration of analysand-analyst relation in psychotherapy can be conceived, writes Heidegger, as an “ongoing gathering of experience and of knowledge in respect to their essential traits.” And adds: “This hermeneutic could become a legislation that would let the law come out of the behavior and of the destiny of the Dasein and—would leave it in the becoming.” (Cf. Binswanger 1992/94, vol. 3, p. 343. Heidegger’s concept of “hermeneutic ex-
ploration” will be discussed below.) Heidegger seems to pursue the idea that the human life exhibits regularities to be hermeneutically explored, which however should not be objectified, but instead treated as something like contingent ontic necessities, i.e., like the past taking the upper hand over the present and the future during an individual Dasein’s being there in the world.

IV. The “Metaphysical” Model of Man for Scientific Anthropology

Let us now go over to the next item of a Kuhnian matrix applied to scientific anthropology, the “metaphysical model” of man. In the Zollikoner Seminare, Heidegger maintains, just as Kuhn does, that the phenomena studied in any factual science are necessarily fitted into a philosophical framework. The same is true in particular of any possible ontic anthropology. What kind of philosophical framework is adequate in this case? Of course, not the one of traditional metaphysics, but rather Heidegger’s own fundamental ontology established by the existential analytic of Sein und Zeit. Yet this framework must be extended, as said above, to include a dasein-sanalytically based philosophical anthropology, a discipline that as such was never developed by Heidegger nor by anybody else.

An example may help to show the incompleteness of the fundamental ontology if taken as the philosophical framework for a scientific anthropology. In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger has dealt in detail with being-towards-death. Yet to the totality of Dasein belongs also the other end, birth, and that theme was not examined at all. As a consequence, the orientation of the existential analytic has been, as Heidegger himself admits, “one-sided” (Heidegger 1962, p. 425). A fortiori, an ontology of man that skips the problem of birth cannot possibly be viewed as a complete philosophical anthropol-
ogy nor as a sufficient guide for a satisfactory ontic anthropology, whether strictly medical or psychological. This example shows that in order to be able to provide a satisfactory framework for a possible scientific anthropology Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein has to be enriched by appropriately derived existentials expressing essences of ontic phenomena that were not considered in *Sein und Zeit* (a necessity of the so-called “regional ontologies”). In addition to the birth and other phenomena of human growth, the all sorts of clinical phenomena have also to be referred to their a priori existential conditions of possibility.

Here again, we can ask about the precise relation between ontological and ontic phenomena. The former are, Heidegger answers, the conditions of possibility, i.e., of the visibility of the latter. More precisely, the ontological phenomena make it possible for us to see factual phenomena presented by concrete individuals as what they are, namely, as manifestations of modes of being of a Dasein (p. 256; cf. p. 342). Just as there are no pure facts in the natural sciences, pure anthropological facts do not exist either. In both cases, the description of a fact is theory-laden. However, there is a difference: natural sciences admit theories containing terms that are merely speculative and even fictional, having no direct application to facts; Heidegger’s anthropology does not make such an admission, but only suggests that higher level phenomena are the ground of the very emergence of facts in the life-time (pp. 7, 234 and 281).

The ontological phenomena that characterize the structure of Dasein not only make ontic phenomena visible, they are themselves visible in the latter. They even provide the true content of what is visible on the ontic level. This content is what Heidegger refers to when he speaks about “essences” of ontic phenomena. Yet, essences or ontological phenomena are not visible in the same way as the ontic ones. The distinction between ontic and ontological
phenomena requires, therefore, a methodological distinction between ontic and ontological evidence as well (pp. 8 and 181). The first ones are perceptible (wahrnehmbare), the second non-perceptible (nicht-wahrnehmbare) and yet “accessible” (vernehmbar, p. 181).

In both cases, there are considerable difficulties that it is hard to overcome immediately (p. 335). The seeing of ontological phenomena is a demanding task indeed, because the essence of the human mode of being is not a visual form nor has any other sensuous aspect (p. 293). If so, how do we get to it and what do we get when we get it? What does Heidegger mean by speaking of “simple seeing” the “uncovered immediate vision of essence” (p. 329)? The answer is: to see something means to understand it as something, which in turn requires us to open a specific and appropriate temporal horizon of the understanding.

Let me give an example. We see the essence of fear only if we view it as somebody’s mode of being-in-the-world in the horizon of the temporal structure of everyday life, which is the circular time of fallenness. No specific biography is needed. Every other existential that makes our everyday being-in-the-world possible is also based on this same mode of temporalization. It is essential to note that this mode of temporalization is itself based on an entirely different mode of temporality, namely, on the original time (of being the “there” or of being the “opening”). In order to avoid errors in these matters and identify correctly the level of analysis, it is not enough to study phenomenological theories, it is necessary to perform exercises (I shall come back to this point later) in getting at particular ontological phenomena themselves by practicing immediate seeing of manifestations of different levels of the Dasein structure (pp. 324, 325 and 329). No previous theory about what there is should be presupposed. (An example of an exercise in seeing phenomena is Heidegger’s inquiry into the essence of stress (p. 179 sq).)
Quite another matter is to see the ontic phenomena. What do we mean by saying that we “sensuously perceive” somebody as being afraid? Again, it is not meant that we get in touch just with somebody’s visual aspect. Considered daseinsanalytically, the perception of fear or any other factual mode of being of a human being splits into two different problems. First, we must understand it as a possible manifestation of a specific existential structure. Second, we have to put it in relation to other factual phenomena of the present, the past, and the future. In the first case, we have to be familiar in an explicit or implicit way with the daseinsanalytic temporal essence of fear. In the second case, we have also to be acquainted with the life history and the concrete situation of the person who is feeling afraid. That is how we can see something concrete concerning a social-historic and individual Dasein without seeing a “form.”

Summing up, an important trait of Heidegger’s existentials, whether old or new, is that they refer to ontological phenomena that show themselves in concreto in the human modes of being, which means that their semantics is different from that of concepts used in suppositions of a metaphysical world behind or above the ontic phenomena (This antiplatonic stand is of course a constant in Heidegger’s thinking) as well as from fictions employed in natural sciences for framing hypotheses and explanations (pp. 5, 160 and 165). Neither the ontological nor the ontic phenomena that Heidegger has in mind are hypothetical, they are all directly accessible.

At this point, Heidegger’s view of the factual science is thus very different indeed form the naturalistic view. This requires that we change the terminology of Kuhn when discussing Heidegger. We can no more speak of “metaphysical model” of man but will speak rather of “phenomenological description” of the “ontological structure” of the human being. However, there is more to be said about the “ontological” model of the research domain of daseinsan-
alytic anthropology. In the last period of his thought, which started in approximately 1936, Heidegger recognized that the study of man has to be developed outside the framework of any and every ontology, the fundamental ontology included. The late Heidegger not only abandoned the traditional metaphysics, general as well as special or regional, but also took a distance from the analytic of Dasein in so far as it is thought to provide the uncovered ground for a still lacking true ontology (1969, p. 34). The question about Being is no more conceived as dealing with the meaning of Being, nor as leading to the ontological question about the being-structure of any particular being, even not of the existential structure of men. It now requires that an entirely new question be formulated and sustained, the one about the clearance or the truth of being?

He changed his views for several reasons, in particular because of the impossibility of deconstructing technology by the projective powers of Dasein. At the end, he renounced all foundational aspirations. As a consequence, he radicalized his project of overcoming metaphysics in Sein und Zeit by making a move that now included the deconstruction of fundamental ontology itself. In other words, he conceived a program of rethinking the relation of man to Being in terms of an event that consists in man’s correspondence to the convocation of Being. Thus, according to the late Heidegger, the philosophical framework of any “true” ontic science cannot be any more an ontology, but only and exclusively the “thinking of Being.” The task of understanding human beings is now formulated as to require asking a very different question—the one concerning that which makes the Dasein structure itself possible, namely, the opening and history of the Being.

In the essay, “Zeit und Sein” (1962), Heidegger declares that the analytic of Dasein has to be “repeated more originally and in an entirely different way” (1969, p. 34). Heidegger never presented
such a Wiederholung. Moreover, in discussing matters of daseinsanalytic anthropology in the Zollikoner Seminare, in a period when his thinking already reached the second phase, he uses the fundamental ontological structure of human beings as established in Sein und Zeit without any substantial additional rethinking. There are indications, however, that in his seminars and discussions with physicians and psychoanalysts in the 1960s he did not lose out of sight his late thoughts. In conversations with Boss, on several occasions, he states that the man is not himself the clearance, but rather the guardian of the clearance and of the ontological difference between Being and beings, that man belongs to the clearance (pp. 223 and 242). In a letter from September 1967 he writes that the clearance and the being-there (Da-sein) belong together and that the determining unity of their belonging together is Ereignis, the appropriating happening (p. 351). This is a sharp deviation from Sein und Zeit, where clearance and the related concept of the relation of man to the being or transcendence are determined as existentials that is, as elements of the ontological structure of human beings and where the concept of the Ereignis is still entirely absent.

One may ask why, having already abandoned the fundamental ontology, in the discussion with Boss, Heidegger sticks mainly to positions explained in Sein und Zeit, although admittedly he occasionally also considers the history of Being (in particular some aspects of modern technological society) as important for the shaping of the science of man (pp. 99, 133, 153, 163 and 353). There are several possible and not mutually exclusive answers. He might have thought that his theses from Sein und Zeit were the only one known to some degree to his discussion partners. Moreover, he certainly maintained that the fundamental ontology still provided, if not the ultimate horizon of a possible science of man, at least the first step in an attempt to open to this discipline its proper domain
of research. There is still another answer that is more pragmatic: Heidegger might have despaired of the possibility that a philosophically unprepared audience be ever able to understand the way of thinking about Being that he developed in his last period, that which drops the guiding question of metaphysics: What is the being of such and such an entity?, and replaces it by the question: What is the truth of Being?

(An indication that this might have been so can be found on p. 291. One may wonder why Heidegger did not insist more with Boss and his group on the temporality of all ontic phenomena studied by sciences of man and why he time and again spoke as if the “essence” of a mode of being-there could be determined in an non-temporal, Husserlian way. One possible answer is that, for the sake of making himself more comprehensible to physicians, he insisted mostly on the first part of Sein und Zeit, leaving out the discussions contained in the second part concerning the temporal interpretation of these same phenomena. If this is so, by willing to save Boss and his colleagues and students from submission to the naturalistic way of thinking Heidegger might well have overstated the essentialist character of his hermeneutics.)

V. Research Procedures of Scientific Anthropology and its Shared Values

Kuhn suggests that the metaphysical part of a paradigm supplies the scientific community that is converted to it with heuristic or research models as well (1970, p. 184). Let me note that there is a statement in Sein und Zeit that goes in the same direction. Basic concepts of a positive science, once they have been introduced by a research preliminary to its normal functioning, determine, says Heidegger, the way in which we get an understanding of the area of
subject-matter of this science and all positive investigation is guided by this understanding (1927, p. 30). This means that the a priori project of a science determines “the clues of the methods of that science, the structure of its way of conceiving things, the possibility of truth and certainty that belongs to it, the way in which things get grounded or proved, the mode in which it is binding for us, and the way it is communicated” (pp. 362-3). Thus, laying the foundations of a science does not mean that we investigate the logical or epistemological status of some scientific discipline that we find developed in front of us, but that we provide it with a “productive logic,” in the sense that we leap ahead of it, as it were, in some area of being, disclose for the first time the ontological structure of entities in this area, and make this structure available to the positive science as “transparent assignment” for its inquiry (pp. 30-31).

Accordingly, if we want to turn Heidegger’s existentials, original or new, into a productive logic or, in Kuhnian terms, into the “metaphysical” part of the paradigm for scientific anthropology, we have to determine all the items listed in the quotation above. Heidegger never did this job. But from what he did say we can gather some hints about how this can be done. Let me pick the first item, the clues of the method of factual science. If we accept the results of the analysis of Dasein as the philosophical framework of our scientific anthropology, we see immediately that, firstly, in constructing theories about human beings, we should not rely on making freely floating hypotheses nor to use the hypothetical method at all (1987, p. 181) and, secondly, in gathering data in this area of research we should not use the experimental method of natural sciences. What kinds of procedures are allowed? Those that are compatible with the structure of entities of that area of investigation, i.e., of human beings. In the following, I shall leave out what Heidegger has to say about data gathering (in particular, his very important remarks on participation in the being-in-the-world
of other human beings, see 1987, pp. 143, 146 and 151) and restrict myself to an analysis his views on theory construction.

As seen above, human beings, as any kind of being, are structured on two levels, the ontological and the ontic level. Therefore, theory construction procedures to be used in human sciences must be able to address human beings on both levels. There must be therefore two types of hermeneutics, the one that operates in the temporal horizon, which makes possible the ontological structures of Dasein, and the other, which moves in the horizon of the everyday time of an individual Dasein. The first type of hermeneutics, founded ultimately on the original temporal finitude of Dasein, belongs to Heidegger’s phenomenology proper (fundamental ontology) and to the future daseinsanalytic philosophical anthropology. The former has been studied very closely and is well known, the latter has yet to be built.

The second type of hermeneutics, founded on the derived concepts of time, belongs to the ontic, i.e., the scientific anthropologies in general and has been given much less attention. An example of the employment of scientific hermeneutics as the method of research is the “hermeneutics of exploration,” a term used by Heidegger in order to refer to the inquiry into the relationship between analysand and analyst in psychotherapy. This way of seeing facts is intended to move, says Heidegger, in a kind of “middle field” between philosophical hermeneutics and mere recording of data (pp. 342 and 350). Heidegger is clearly not speaking of hermeneutics in the sense of the original mode of self-understanding, which is basic for philosophical research as such, but of a derived method of understanding and interpreting. His purpose is to identify a procedure by means of which one could tackle “concrete problems,” those that do not belong “too much in the domain of fundamentals and of what is ‘purely philosophical’” (p. 348). What Heidegger has in view is a special kind of procedure that can be used not only as
hermeneutics of everyday life but also as a *heuristics*, i.e., as a science of formulating and solving concrete problems of human life.

The hermeneutics of exploration requires us, as said before, to *exercise* the capacity of looking away from naturalistic causal explanations and of learning to see other persons as beings-in-the-world. This is not an easy task, warns Heidegger. The admission of a being such as Dasein “is extremely difficult and unusual and must be reassessed again and again” (p. 280). Let me elaborate further on this difficulty.

On the one hand, the full understanding of an ontic phenomenon requires a previous phenomenological, i.e., philosophical analysis of its temporal essence, as exemplified above by the analysis of the phenomenon of fear. Indeed, what do we gain in a human science by just explaining genetically something if we do not understand what it is? And we cannot say that we have understood everything in this area unless we see it in the *full extension* of the horizon of everyday time. That is, not just the *original* finite circular time is to be taken into account, but also the derived life-time of each individual that involves the temporal interval between birth and death and allows for something like a life history and a biography. In the opening of the original time, only ontological and not ontic phenomena can be seen and have meaning. In order to understand more concrete questions, we need appropriate data given within more concrete horizons. Therefore, the analysis of facts that characterize a human life necessarily includes considerations about birth, early childhood, maturational development, and eventually death. If this is so, in order to be able to come to the complete understanding human modes of being at the ontological level we have to produce the *secondary existentials* of birth, early childhood, growth, and so on. The hermeneutic effort just described must be carried out by going from the bottom level concrete facts of every-
day life up to genetic explanations and still further to the ontological structures implied.

Heidegger has never climbed up this way. But he clearly saw that this is a necessary task to be solved by any accomplished scientific anthropology. What is more, he gave a useful although very brief sketch of how new existentials are introduced and used. The relation between ontic interpretation and ontology is, if seen historically, always, he says, a “correlative” one. This means that during scientific research “new existentials are discovered from the ontic experience” (p. 259). These new existentials, once thematized and included in the daseinsanalytically based philosophical anthropology, are precisely what is needed in order to provide a sufficiently complete ontological framework for interpreting ontic phenomena at a certain stage of scientific research and clinical activity.

In the late phase of his thinking, Heidegger abandoned, as said, the idea that the relation of man to the Being, a legitimate topic for a fundamental ontology, could be expended into a complete ontology of Dasein. Since the study of the topology and the history of Being is considered as an overcoming of the analytic of Dasein and of the fundamental ontology, it has also to be taken as the ultimate horizon for understanding concrete human beings as well, which implies that it has to be used for working out a new productive logic of the science of man, different from the one that can be extracted from Sein und Zeit.

Here again Heidegger was not as explicit as one would like. But the Heideggerian anthropologists should make it so. Of course, the task of explaining what the thinking of Being could possibly imply for a science of man falls entirely outside the scope of this paper. (In Zollikoner Seminare Heidegger gives some hints in this direction, but obviously despairs of explaining them to Boss (cf. 1987, pp. 223, 291 and 351). I myself have ventured some steps in the field
in Loparic 2005.) Let me point to just one aspect of the paradigm building problem hinted at here.

To say that the new way of thinking about Being is an overcoming of *Sein und Zeit* does not imply that the latter is simply dropped. It is *reinterpreted*. Indeed, even after introducing the new concepts of his late period, Heidegger did not abandon the concepts of the fundamental ontology. We come thus to the conclusion that the introduction of the new productive logic is to be viewed as consisting in something like a paradigm switch internal to Heidegger’s thought. That means that the change should be seen as not cumulative, and yet not as entirely eliminatory, in the sense in which a Gestalt switch in the seeing of visual figures is also conservative to a certain degree. The main requirement to be met is that in addition to the duly modified two levels of description and circular interpretations, identified above, the scientific anthropology should contain some higher degrees of consideration.

The *highest level* will of course have to be that of the opening and of the history of Being. Immediately beneath we can place the ontological phenomena dealt with in a preliminary way by the analytic of Dasein: the Dasein’s transcendence of the world (the being-to-the-death) and, beneath them, the phenomena of Dasein’s being-in-the-world. (Heidegger has insisted with Boss on the bifurcation in the structure of Dasein between being-in-the-world and the superior level of transcendence apparently because it has been neglected by Binswanger and others.) It seems that the next level is to be thought of as containing derived existentials that belong to the so-called regional ontologies. These first four levels are the subject matter for philosophical studies, conducted either in the style of the thinking of the Being itself, as practiced by the late Heidegger, or as a phenomenological ontology, as exemplified in *Sein und Zeit*. (The important and difficult question whether the thinking of Being still belongs to hermeneutics cannot be treated
Going downwards, we come to the fifth level, that of the systematic ordering of ontic phenomena, which themselves are gathered and displayed on the sixth bottom level. These last two levels are the natural place of daseinsanalytic scientific anthropologies.

We come thus to the conclusion that late Heidegger’s productive logic for the scientific anthropology puts forward what might be called double circularity. The one circularity is that which exists within each one of the six levels of interpretation. It characterizes the movement of the understanding within one or another of different and hierarchically ordered temporal horizons. The other circularity is that which joins up the hierarchy of the six different levels of description and interpretation. In the first case, we go from the future to the past and the present of a specific temporal horizon. In the second case, we move up and down from the lowest ontic level to the highest ontological ones. On the one hand, ontic facts must be seen in the light of whole hierarchy that makes them possible. On the other hand, ontic descriptions, which at the start of the inquiry have received their “determination” from their “essential content” are apt to provide reasons, while the inquiry is progressing, for completing the phenomenology of their initial ontological determinations by new existentials beyond the previously admitted ones.

As a consequence, the Heideggerian anthropologist is necessarily involved not only in different horizontal hermeneutic circles, which are characteristic of each level of interpretation, but also in several vertical hermeneutic circles. It starts with basic ontological and even post-metaphysical admissions, goes downwards through derived existentials to everyday ontic phenomena, thus becoming able to understand them and discover new ontic connections among them. After achieving this point, the circle of the understanding turns upwards and stimulates the fundamental ontological research of yet unknown derived, fundamental existentials or even the thinking of aspects of
the history of Being that illuminate and make these newly established ontic connections possible. (Birth or being at the beginning is an example of a ontological phenomenon whose inquiry was not pursued by Heidegger at all and that must be described on the level of fundamental existentials if we want to give a Heideggerian interpretation of a series of important ontic phenomena, recently discovered by the psychoanalytic research (cf. in particular Winnicott 1965, 1986 and 1989) and related to the early stages of human life.)

Let me make another important methodological point: the one about the language of description and interpretation. In the dasein-sanalytic science of man, language must differ from the conceptual language that objectifies that which is spoken about. It should not be conceived as the language of calculus nor as the vehicle of information (pp. 25 and 118-19). This implies that our scientific discourse about man should never become merely an unambiguous verbalization of objective facts as happens in natural science, but “must essentially be ambiguous as is for instance, the language of poetry” (p. 184). What is this language positively? It is that which indicates (das Zeigende). An indicative or indicial language says “that such and such demands us to correspond so and so” (p. 185). To use language in agreement with its essence means to respond concretely to a factual demand by indicating our understanding of how something (an ontic phenomenon) is connected with something else (another factual datum) in a concrete everyday motivational context (p. 233). When we do that, we do not apply concepts, we do not calculate, we do not give information. We rather take part in what is shown to (have to) be going on.

One might wonder whether ontic anthropologies can profit from descriptions of manifestations of the human that have already been made in the language of the human sciences constituted within the Cartesian, i.e., naturalistic paradigm. The answer is yes. However, in order to be able to make a sound use of these descrip-
tions, we have to effect a transition “from the common scientific terminology to the description language for phenomena” (p. 345). Even when conceding this possibility, Heidegger shows himself “very skeptical” about actual gains to be expected from such an exercise (p. 342). His main reason seems to have been the fact that there is no theory-free language and that accordingly facts described in the language of natural science have metaphysical contents fused with really ontic ones. Nevertheless, Heidegger has made various very interesting attempts at showing how some Freudian descriptive concepts (such as projection and repression) may be translated into the language of daseinsanalytic description.

As to the fourth item of Heidegger’s paradigm, the “shared values,” it is clear that the standard values of natural science such as measurability, calculability, or indeed producibility of man or of his modes of being are not even considered. Nor does Heidegger seek in the first place predictions, internal or external consistency, simplicity, empirical plausibility, or indeed for any other “logical” value of traditional factual science. The main values that should characterize a daseinsanalytic science of man are rather practical or even ethical. (I have discussed Heidegger’s views of ethics in Loparic 2004.)

**VI. Paradigmatic Problems**

I come now to my final point, to what Heidegger has to say about “paradigmatic problems” and solutions that may characterize a daseinsanalytic factual science and its research. The center of unity of any daseinsanalytic science is the existing man (p. 259). Now, in agreement with the analytic of human existence, the basic element of this structure is the relation to Being itself. Even our relation to others, the solicitude (*Fürsorge*), which implies responsibility of letting others be and letting them be independent and free, is founded on our understanding of the meaning of Being
or, as the late Heidegger says, on our belonging to the clearance of Being. The central aim of a daseinsanalytic science of man and, by implication, of the daseinsanalytic therapy is, therefore, not to solve problems related to being-in-the-world as such (for instance, problems related to instinctual conflicts, treated by the Freudian psychoanalysis), but to the very possibility of being-in-the-world. The former problems may be divided, as in Kant, into theoretical and practical. The latter are very different in kind, since they are not about thinking one way or the other or about doing this or that, but about realizing our very nature. (This idea of anthropology is to be compared with the Kantian concept of moral in opposition to physical anthropology.) All disturbances, sociological as well as medical, are of the same kind, namely, limitations of the possibility to be a free human being. “We practice psychology, sociology, psychotherapy,” says Heidegger, “in order to help people, so that they can achieve the aim of adaptation and liberty in the widest sense” (p. 199). (This way of looking at central problems of psychotherapy can be approximated to Winnicott’s view that life (and, therefore, life oriented psychoanalysis) is more about being than about sex (Winnicott 1986, p. 35).

In solving this kind of problems, substantial help can of course be awaited from philosophy and other areas of human culture, including phenomenological ontology and considerations about the history of Being. But that is not enough. The problem of realizing our very nature also leads inevitably to “determinate” or “concrete” problems that must be formulated and solved on lower levels of analysis where ontic anthropologies are at home. In order to solve problems on these levels of specification mere philosophy is insufficient. Indeed, “philosophy does not have a ready answer to all questions” (p. 350), as some members of Boss’s group appear to have believed. People must receive a methodological education, Heidegger warns, in order “not to expect [from philosophy] solu-
tions of any and every problem” (p. 336). The solution of factual anthropological problems requires factual experience and “professional understanding” (p. 343). Heidegger seems to be talking here about an understanding like the one that characterizes the ontic anthropology as described above. It is in this spirit that he asks Boss to demonstrate “scientifically” by his own “research work” the phenomenological propositions put forward in the Seminar (p. 347) and to “provide more substance to fundamental reflections” by means of his rich “medical experience” (p. 352).

VII. Final Remarks

I hope that this Kuhn-inspired, very schematic and very partial presentation of Heidegger’s views of a possible science of man may help in organizing his ideas. It is instrumental for exposing their true novelty as well as for the possibility of expanding them into a better articulated daseinsanalytic scientific paradigm, capable of guiding the research of an identifiable scientific community. Of course, Kuhn does not seem to have ever seriously thought about a factual science that would abandon the principle of causality, substitute a daseinsanalytic ontological framework for the metaphysical one, do research by moving in various hermeneutic circles, and value above all helping human beings to be themselves and to be free. But this fact does not need to prevent us from analyzing Heidegger’s initial proposal of a daseinsanalytic science of man and even from venturing some additional moves in the development of this discipline by using Kuhn’s theory of scientific growth that, as we know, was inspired by developments situated far beyond the strict sphere of natural sciences. The same strategy may also help, as shown above, to identify some of the shortcomings of the Heidegger’s project. One would, for instance, expect Heidegger to be clearer about the nature
of systematic ordering of ontic phenomena, not to speak about the badly needed derived existentials.

(This paper is a restatement and a broadening of views initially developed in Loparic 1999a e 1999b.)

References