

# *Introduction*

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In *Spanish-speaking Latin America*, phenomenology has a history of over seventy years, the beginning of which can be traced back to José Ortega y Gasset's three visits during the first half of the 20th century, and also to the efforts made by prominent thinkers, such as Antonio Caso in Mexico and Francisco Romero in Argentina, to bring phenomenological themes and standpoints into philosophical teaching within the region. In the next generation, phenomenology has been able to build its way and become strong and stable through the endeavors of José Gaos and Eduardo Nicol in Mexico, Danilo Cruz Vélez in Colombia, Ernesto Mayz Vallenilla in Venezuela, Alberto Wagner de Reyna and Francisco Miró Quesada in Perú, Félix Schwartzmann in Chile, and Eugenio Pucciarelli in Argentina. It should be noted that, in the 1970s, volumes written by Alberto Rosales, and Guillermo Hoyos Vásquez were published in the *Phaenomenologica* series.

The present situation shows a promising amount and variety of work. Local organizations have been established since 1992 in Argentina, Colombia, México, Perú, and Venezuela, and the First Latin American Colloquium of Phenomenology, held at Puebla, México, in 1999, led to the foundation of the Latin American Circle for Phenomenology (CLAFEN). Its Secretariat has been

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located at the Peruvian Pontifical Catholic University under the direction of Rosemary Rizo-Patrón de Lerner, and works in close collaboration with the electronic site in Mexico, under the responsibility of Antonio Ziri6n Quijano. The Second Latin Colloquium was held in Bogot at the University of San Buenaventura in 2002, the Third in Lima at the Catholic University in 2004, and the Fourth took place in Bogot at the Universidad Javeriana in 2007. CLAFEN's Peruvian group also organized the 32nd Annual Meeting of the Husserl Circle in Lima (2000). It was the first time that this meeting was held outside North America. International conferences on phenomenology have also been organized in Chile at the Alberto Hurtado University (2004), at the University of Chile (2005), and at the Chilean Pontifical Catholic University (2005). Annual national conferences, with the participation of foreign guest speakers, are held at the Iberoamerican University of Mexico, at the Center for Philosophical Studies at the Nacional Academy of Sciences in Buenos Aires, and at the Circle for Phenomenology and Hermeneutics of Santa Fe-Paran. CLAFEN edits a yearbook, *Acta fenomenol6gica latinoamericana*, of which two volumes have been already published containing the proceedings of the Second and Third Colloquia as well as free contributions and translations of significant texts of major phenomenologists.

The Latin American Spanish speaking part of *Phenomenology 2005* is composed of twelve essays that encompass various phenomenological trends and issues from the notion of phenomenology itself through analyses of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur, and Emmanuel Levinas to the application of phenomenology in the fields of psychiatry and sociology.

Antonio Ziri6n trenchantly deals with the notion of phenomenology and states that neither Husserl's famous call "To the things themselves!" nor its continuation in the "principle of all principles"

can afford a common basis for all the trends. He argues that Jean-François Lavigne's recent examination of methodical principles active in the early development of phenomenology—with the addition of the principle of the phenomenological reduction to the two above-mentioned—must be developed in order to focus on the intentional correlation and the reflective investigation of subjective lived experience, for phenomenology has been from the outset a return to subjectivity. Zirión goes on to discuss Michel Henry's thesis that classic phenomenology has ignored the difference between the intentional or extatic givenness of the world and the self-affection of life. He raises the question about what kind of intuition or evidence has enabled Henry to know about self-affection and make inquiries into it. As there must be some sort of evidence for the self-revelation of life, we must distinguish between the self-awareness of life through self-affection and the knowledge or intentional insight that we have into self-affection. In other words, Henry is doing phenomenology with Husserl's tools.

An ambiguity pertaining to Husserl's foundational project from the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* to the *Crisis* is examined in Rosemary Rizo-Patrón Lerner's essay. It concerns the oscillation between a positive valuation of technical calculus in order to compensate for human being's limited capacity and the negative assessment of its blindness regarding the nature of scientific and philosophic thought, and the oscillation between the positive valuation of the foundational character of the basic intuitive representations, and the negative acknowledgment of the radical finitude of these representations. In this remarkable survey of the issue, the author includes an analysis of the distinction between the qualifications proper to philosophers of logic and technicians in logic, and how this contrast is advanced in order to give a positive appraisal of the logic of contents against deductive logic.

Luis R. Rabanaque's essay addresses at length the role of the noema, and gives a compelling case for the view that noematic constitution does not yield entities, but rather a network of levels and strata that have not been sufficiently taken into account in discussions of the noema. Levels are considered as wider sense-unities in the order of their foundation, and strata are moments of a level insofar as they constitute a nonindependent part of its sense. Detailed analyses show that levels and strata are not only arranged vertically, but also in a "criss-cross" manner in order to make up a multidimensional construction in which they impregnate each other.

The Husserlian notion of intersubjectivity receives a threefold treatment that concerns empathy, the scope of transcendental subjectivity, and ethics. An analysis of the experience of the other's pain in empathy is undertaken by Germán Vargas Guillén with a phenomenological demarcation and description of situations. First, when the distress of another person converges with my own as I am informed about the circumstances that caused it, a shared pain draws forth the experience of pity. Second, when two persons are constrained to separate after an intense mutual relationship, pain is lived together and elicits the experience of sympathy. Third, when a family suffers the loss of one of its members, a communitarian pain calls forth the experience of commotion. Finally, when parents must come to terms with the illness of a child, an individualized pain evokes the experience of empathy.

Roberto Walton considers how, in his projects for recasting the *Cartesianische Meditationen*, Eugen Fink offers a number of insights on the unfolding of the transcendental dimension after the reduction by showing the role of sense-transmission in the self-overstepping of egology. The paradoxical situation in which egological subjectivity is endowed with other constitutive sense-formations together with its own, although the former do not appear to have

a transcendental origin, can only vanish if it is shown that others in the phenomenon conceal transcendental others. Problems linked to differentiation and wholeness in sense-transmission are also discussed.

In a third contribution dealing with intersubjectivity, Julia Iribarne offers a fitting clarification of Husserl's position on the foundation of ethics. After penetrating remarks on the Kantian background and the setting aside of formalism, she shows that his view cannot be separated from the notion of reason conceived of as a unique function capable of performing logic and valuing acts. Furthermore, the author aims at showing that the initial formulation persists and is enriched throughout further developments brought forth by genetic analyses. No ruptures, but rather a deeper and broader research on basic themes becomes manifest through the subsequent stages. In a final assessment, following Hans Rainer Sepp's claim that Husserl's thought reveals an increasing importance of the concept of teleology, Iribarne dwells upon the close relationship between teleological and ethical issues.

There is also an important place in the collection for hermeneutics. Adrián Bertorello attempts to overcome Paul Ricoeur's distinction between a long and a short way in interpretation. With this purpose he takes up Gérard Genette's narrative theory in order to analyze Martin Heidegger's discourse, and argues that an analeptic procedure enables Heidegger to recall previous events in the history of philosophy and to make a selection among them. Analepsis can be heterodiegetic or homodiegetic depending on whether it is external or internal to the first narration line of action. What Heidegger practices is a kind of homodiegetic analepsis that allows him to recover an omitted fragment of history by going back to its origins in a destruction of the history of philosophy. Ricoeur's thesis that Heidegger follows a short way cannot be maintained

on convincing grounds because the author of *Sein und Zeit* has to face the different traditions to which the concepts of philosophy belong with the purpose of destroying them semantically through an interpretation of their inflection points. This is the reason why his way is as long as that of Ricoeurs.

Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics is central in the contributions of CLAFEN's Peruvian group. Pepi Patrón inquires into the interweaving of Aristotelian and Kantian ethical and political themes both in Hannah Arendt's political philosophy and Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. She stresses the analyses of the former on the contingency of reason, on the plurality of forms of life and rationality, and on public space as the condition and end of action and speech, i.e., the place where agents reveal themselves in word and deed. Also essential is Gadamer's recognition of the Other as an Other as a distinctive feature of hermeneutic experience. The author sees the radical relevance of Gadamerian hermeneutics for many of our contemporary concerns in its assertion that there is no *ethos* without *logos*, and contends that the basic idea of belonging to a community cannot be separated from the demands of the normative and teleological dimension of human coexistence.

Gadamer's debt to phenomenology is the theme of Cecilia Montegudo's essay. She draws our attention to his views on the development of science, the future of European humankind, and the commitment of philosophy with society. Next a nuanced portrayal is offered not only of Husserlian undercurrents in his hermeneutics, but also of the way in which Gadamer, in the framework of a shared struggle against the pretension of universality pertaining to technical-scientific rationality, attempts to re-establish again and again a dialogue with Husserl. The thesis that phenomenology, hermeneutics, and metaphysics make up in combination philosophy itself is also highlighted, and the conclusion is that Gadamer's

attempt to find a state of balance between the unilaterality of science and the coexistence of diverse cultures is reminiscent of Husserl's norm-giving aimed at infinite tasks.

Following Ricoeur's and Levinas's views, Aníbal Fornari focuses on personal identity. According to Ricoeur, narrativity expresses its dramatic and mediate character. Central to the narrative model is the insistence that an exceptional event sets aside the centeredness of subjectivity in favor of a bodily being that acts, suffers, and is related to others. On the other hand, Levinas discloses a dimension of presence as the nonrepresentable epiphany of the face that enables an access to selfhood. In doing so, he points out the defects of a narrative mediation when it is handed over both to itself and to a hermeneutics of testimony, insofar as they do not testify to the present of this presence. In this essay full of religious overtones, Fornari's main thesis is that an unforeseeable event, as a historical possibility, unexpectedly renders possible the emergence of selfhood through the revelation of the Other as an untimely presence that, by introducing hope, takes up and sublates narrative mediation and ethical interpellation. On the ground of a unique Face, another history is installed within history. This means that, by virtue of its diachronic novelty, the possibility of something impossible reverses historical time.

Three further essays deal with the significance of phenomenology in the human sciences. María Lucrecia Rovaletti inquires into the phobic aspect in noematic manners of givenness. Thus, a dog may appear in such a way that it has a repulsive character that is experienced as a threat. In contradistinction to the stance of a cynophile, who experiences dogs with qualities that motivate a deep affection, the phobic attitude results in a reduction of the positive aspects and leads to an absolute supremacy of the negative aspects. The object is experienced as intrusive and hence the living body

as labile. Whereas we regularly pass from the perception of an object to a reflective consciousness of the act, the phobic person cannot come to understand how his particular object is constituted. Hence therapeutic analysis must help the subject by considering that the object has a second sense that must be deciphered through a hermeneutic procedure in order to disclose what is distorted by the manifest sense.

The essays are not lacking criticism. As he calls into question the possibilities of social phenomenology, Carlos Belvedere contends that there are tensions and obstacles that affect its development. They can be disclosed through an analysis of the two paths followed by Alfred Schutz. The first path leads to a nonphenomenological social ontology, which, instead of focusing on the existence of social realities, limits itself to a commentary on phenomenological writings. The other path is hermeneutic and cannot be considered as strictly phenomenological because it envisages the social realm from the standpoint of a theory of symbolism that draws more on structural linguistics than on phenomenology. It is argued that, even if both paths show some affinity with its methods, phenomenology is brought before its boundaries.

Drawing also on Schutz's analyses, Déborah Motta looks into the role of temporality in the process of socialization by showing how the *We*-relationship emerges in a shared living present through an immediate participation in the Other's stream of consciousness. After inspecting isochronal experiences by many subjects, she goes on to examine the pure *We*-relation as a condition of possibility for all social experiences. From this a priori of social life derive different concrete social relations beginning with the primary socialization of the face-to-face relationship.

While a few of the essays of the Spanish speaking section might be disputed on certain points, and do not reflect all of contempo-

rary scholarship in phenomenology, they all bear witness to a growing tradition of scholarly excellence and reflective insights and will surely serve as a valuable informative tool.

In *Portuguese-speaking Latin America*, i.e., Brazil, phenomenological studies started in the late 1950s, mainly in the form of lectures and courses delivered by young Brazilian philosophers who recently had returned from Germany (Gerd Gornheim, for instance) or other countries, as well as by foreign teachers arriving from Europe or from Spanish speaking Latin America (Uruguay, Argentina), where phenomenological studies started earlier under the influence of developments in Spain, Mexico, and Europe. This start was helped by the arrival of existentialism, symbolized by the visit of Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir to Brazil in 1960.

Existentialism became influential not only in the academies, but was also assimilated by Brazilian youth movements, Catholic or otherwise, and even entered the popular culture. Rather than as a philosopher, Sartre was read mostly as a playwright and as a novelist. In this way, a context was created that made a dialogue possible between the newly arrived phenomenology and the more traditional ways of doing philosophy in Brazil, including the Thomistic and more generally Medieval tradition, predominant at that time at the Catholic universities, as well as Marxism and Hegelianism, which had the upper hand at the state universities. Despite resistances coming from different sources, e.g., that of those influenced by the French structuralist historiography (Gueroult) and reluctant to engage in cross-school discussions, phenomenology was treated in several significant cases not as rival but rather as a welcome complementary way of thought. Heidegger was discussed together with Marx and Hegel (as was happening at that time in other places, for instance, in the Zagreb School in Yugoslavia) or compared with the scholastic ontology, as was done by Cornelio Fabro in Italy.

In the 1960s, Brazilian students went abroad in ever greater numbers, mainly to France, Belgium, and Germany and produced master's and doctoral degree theses, some of which were published in foreign languages. Guido de Almeida's study of Husserl published in *Phaenomenologica* and Marcus Lutz Müller's thesis on Sartre are successful examples of this kind. Due to language difficulties, however, the impact of these writings on the Brazilian academic circles was relatively limited. More significant indeed was the appearance of translations, mainly by philosophers working in Rio de Janeiro (Emmanuel Carneiro Leão) and Porto Alegre (Ernildo Stein). Heidegger was at that time was under systematic attack by the Frankfurt School (Adorno) in Germany, but, interestingly enough, was by far the most privileged author for Brazilian translators. As for Husserl, one of the first of his texts translated into Portuguese was the Sixth *Logische Untersuchung*, work done by Zeljko Loparic in collaboration with Andréa Maria de Campos Loparic and published in 1975 in a volume that also contained writings by Maurice Merleau-Ponty selected and translated by Marilena Chauí.

Another development took place in Brazil in the 1970s that was decisive for the surge of phenomenological studies in the country: graduate programs were created in all more organized university centers (São Paulo, Rio, Porto Alegre, Campinas, etc.). Soon after that, these programs were joint into a covering organization – ANPOF (National Association of Graduate Studies in Philosophy), founded in 1983 under the auspices of the Brazilian Federal Government. At present, there are several dozen such programs in Brazil and they are responsible for two main new features in the Brazilian philosophical life: the internalization of philosophical research in general and a clear rise of quality.

Indeed, with the help of the ANPOF, graduate programs initiated increasingly better coordinated, better qualified, and much more independent and original studies in various areas of philosophy, thus creating an environment which was quite favorable also to phenomenology. Important phenomenological research groups were founded in Rio de Janeiro, Porto Alegre, São Paulo, and Campinas, to which must be added scattered smaller groups and individual researchers from all over the country, one of the most important examples being that of Benedito Nunes, who never accepted to move from his native and distant Belém do Pará. While translations were continuing, more and more master and doctoral theses were produced in Portuguese along with first monographs on phenomenological subject matters. Writings by Ernildo Stein, Emmanuel Carneiro Leão, and Zeljko Loparic on Heidegger, by Marilena Chauí on Merleau-Ponty, and by Carlos Alberto Moura on Husserl may be cited as examples.

As a natural consequence, other organizations and institutions were created. In 1999, the Brazilian Phenomenological Society (SBF) came into being ([www.cle.unicamp.br/sbf](http://www.cle.unicamp.br/sbf)), within which are now operating four regional sections (North Brazilian, South Brazilian, and those in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo). Like any society of its kind, the SBF organizes and sponsors scientific meetings and develops various types of international relations, including those with the OPO, the CLAFEN, and the AFFEN (Portuguese Association for Phenomenological Philosophy). In addition, several research groups were established within the ANPOF, such as the Heidegger Group, the Levinas Group, and the Philosophy and Psychoanalysis Group (GFPP), various members of which work on phenomenology.

One should mention also the Research Group in Philosophy and Psychotherapeutic Practices at the Pontifical Catholic University of

São Paulo, which was created already in 1995 by Zeljko Loparic with the objective to study psychoanalysis—in particular the new psychoanalytic paradigm introduced by Donald W. Winnicott—in the light of Heidegger's Existential Analytic and his Zollikon Seminars. Since its foundations, the GFPP organizes separate annual colloquia on Winnicott and on Heidegger (each of which has reached in 2007 its 12th edition ([www.centrowinnicott.com.br](http://www.centrowinnicott.com.br)), which are now co-sponsored by the SBF as well as by the Heidegger and Philosophy and Psychoanalysis Groups of the ANPOF. In 1999, Loparic founded the review *Natureza humana* (cf. [www.centrowinnicott.com.br](http://www.centrowinnicott.com.br)) specialized in philosophy and psychoanalysis, which later on became the official organ of the SBF.

Over the last decade these institutions have developed a series of activities that resulted in a considerable production only a small part of which can be found in *Natureza humana*. One of the characteristics of this production is the development of themes that, although related to international trends in phenomenology, have been elaborated within specifically Brazilian perspectives. Simultaneously, the work of translations has continued, with a series of translations of Heidegger, most of them done by Marcia Sá Cavalcante Schuback in close collaboration with Emmanuel Carneiro Leão and also by Marco Casanova. Also in Rio, the project of translating the whole of Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen* is now underway.

The fifteen Brazilian papers of this OPO Edition are most of them written by the new generation of scholars educated mainly in Brazil. They have been selected by the four SBF sections and the four research groups mentioned above. It is no surprise that they reflect local Brazilian points of view on phenomenological problems, in particular the widespread interest in Heidegger. According to their subject matter, the papers can be classified under following headings: phenomenology in historical perspective, Husserl,

Heidegger, Heidegger and Psychoanalysis, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Levinas, and Schutz.

After making some introductory comments on aspects of Hegelian thought, the paper by Alfredo de Oliveira Moraes, “Hegel, a Fenomenologia e a (bio)Ética ou a Vida Ética,” proposes that the concepts, notion, categories, and other elements from Hegelian System be taken into consideration in order to introduce the dialectical way of thinking into the phenomenology.

Husserl is the subject of “Significado Enquanto Atributo de Intenções nas *Logische Untersuchungen* de Husserl” by Dario Texeira. He reconstructs Husserl’s conception of meaning, expounded in the *Logische Untersuchungen*, and defends Husserl’s central thesis according to which the meaning of an expression should be explained as the intentional content *in specie* of the speaker’s intention and thus as an ideal attribute (i.e., an universal) instantiated in the intentional content of the meaning intention that the expression intimates. Some theoretical advantages of this conception are discussed as well, especially those concerning the account of our ordinary consciousness of meanings.

André Duarte’s paper “Becoming Other: Heidegger and the Trace of a Post-Metaphysical Ethics” is the first one on Heidegger. It presents new evidence for the argument, developed previously by various authors in Brazil and abroad, that a variety of post-metaphysical ethics can be legitimately traced back to some statements of Heidegger’s about *being-with* in *Sein und Zeit*.

Zeljko Loparic’s contribution, “Heidegger’s Project of a Scientific Anthropology,” starts by noting that Heidegger is often understood as being a decided critic of philosophical anthropology and, therefore, and of every science of man. This is certainly unobjectionable if the philosophical anthropology is conceived as based upon the traditional ontology that takes human being as one

among many entities merely present (*vorhanden*) in the world, and if the science of man is seen as branch of natural science. This also appears to hold in the context of Heidegger's late thought, which seems to leave but little room for a non-objectifying and still scientific way of thinking and talking about man. Indeed, in many late texts Heidegger presents himself as an outright opponent not only of modern science, but of scientific thinking in general. In *Sein und Zeit*, however, Heidegger makes some very specific remarks about the foundation of a philosophy and of a science that arises from authentic existence. In this context, there is place also for the philosophical as well as scientific study of man, that is, for the philosophical and scientific anthropology. The same position is defended in seminars that Heidegger held in Zollikon during the 1960s and in conversations with Medard Boss, made available in *Zollikoner Seminare* (1987).

The paper by Róbson Ramos dos Reis "Conteção e aprisionamento dos humanos: a sublimidade da natureza em Os conceitos fundamentais da metafísica," examines the notion of the sublime within the reconstruction of the phenomenological interpretation of the living nature and animal organisms in *The Basic Concepts of Metaphysics* (Heidegger, 1929/30). It is intended to show that the ontology adequate for the proper behavior with the living nature implies the recognition of a sublimity predicated of nature itself. Having presented the ontological identity of the organisms with the two concepts of captivation (*Bennommenheit*) and interpenetration of the dis-inhibiting rings, Reis shows that Heidegger identifies in the adaptive dynamics of the organisms a movement of construction and overcoming of the nature by nature itself. In these terms, the sublime is not only the proportionate feeling for contact with nature. It does not give rise to the game between the finitude human being and the autonomy of the reason, but it is character-

istic of the nature *qua* nature. The sublimity of nature is relative to a dynamics that is not internal to subjectivity, but points out the dimension of manifestation of ontological structures. In face of this dynamics, an attunement appears that Heidegger calls restraint (*Verhaltenheit*). In fact, restraint is asserted as the condition for any kind of relation with living creatures that observes the adequate ontological categorization of nature.

In his “O Homem Entediado: Tédio, Niilismo e Técnica,” Marco Antonio Casanova approaches another topic from *The Basic Concepts of Metaphysics*: Heidegger’s conception of nihilism as the event of abandonment of Being and the consequences of this conception to human Dasein. In order to reconstruct such a conception and to undertake an analysis of these consequences, one concentrates oneself on Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought as well as on the development of elements of this interpretation within of Heidegger’s critique of modern technology. Through these two moments, one comes then to show in which measure Nietzsche’s philosophy and the world of technology as its radicalization imply a lost of the self for human Dasein. The final thesis in this context is that boredom is the fundamental attunement of the nihilistic world because boredom has an essential connection with the loss of self.

José Carlos Michelazzo is inspired by the second Heidegger. In his “Double Transcendence and Historicity: the Debt of Heidegger to Master Eckhart” Michelazzo shows that Heidegger’s relations with Master Eckhart do not reduce to sporadic employments of words or expressions from medieval mysticism, but, on the contrary, serve as inspiration for his audacious notion of man’s essence that is interpreted from its common-pertinence (*Zusammengehörigkeit*) with Being and oriented by a circular movement of double transcendence. In the midst of the various circles so present in the phi-

osopher's thought, there is the circle of historicity, the central aim of this essay, which affirms that existence originates from abyss of future (first transcendence). From that abyss germinates the last possible human gesture, death. In order for man to be able to apprehend this final gesture in his authentically historical (*geschichtlich*) character, he needs the courage to take over the weight of his finitude and then to reach a free existence guided by a "futural-vigorous past" (*zukunftig-Gewesenheit*) (second transcendence).

Heidegger's relevance for psychoanalysis is the object of three papers. In "A ontologia Fundamental de Heidegger e a crítica à metapsicologia freudiana: o homem enquanto *Dasein*," Caroline Vasconcelos Ribeiro criticises those who reduce human beings to physical or even mathematical structures, turning the man into an object, as does Freud. She appeals to Heidegger's *Zollikon Seminars* in order to show how human beings can be taken out of the closure of modern objectivity and subjectivity.

The essay by Eder Soares Santos, "D. W. Winnicott: instigações a uma fenomenologia existencial," aims at showing that certain points of Donald W. Winnicott's psychoanalytic theory may stimulate inquiries into still pending aspects of Heidegger's existential analysis, such as the natality, the physicality, and the reaching of the potentiality-for-being of *Dasein*. Consequently, it can be said that some Winnicottian ideas on being and going-on-being may help to develop new insights into essentials of Heidegger's theory as found in *Sein und Zeit*.

The third and the last paper of this set is "Winnicott e Heidegger: temporalidade e esquizofrenia," in which Elsa Oliveira Dias tries to establish connections between the psychoanalysis of Winnicott and the existential analysis of Heidegger. Her aim is in particular 1) to examine the observations of Heidegger on the structure of the *Dasein* in newly born babies, formulated in para-

graph 15 of *Einleitung in die Philosophie* (GA 27) in the light of Winnicott's conceptions of the constitution of the early self, giving a special emphasis to the primitive temporality of the baby and to the temporary character of the trauma, and 2) to analyze, taking into account Winnicott's theory of schizophrenic disturbances, the observations on a case of schizophrenia made by Heidegger in *Zollikon Seminars*.

Merleau-Ponty is the author discussed in "Por uma intencionalidade não-noética: a superação do dualismo mente-corpo à luz da noção merleau-pontyana de *expressão*" by Paula Mousinho Martins. She analyzes the concept of *expression*, by which Merleau-Ponty intended to neutralize the traditional opposition—still present in Husserl's phenomenology—between the sign and its meaning. This and correlative distinctions are in fact due, she shows, to the classical *scheme/content dualism*, which is kept by Husserl as he maintains the *hylé* as an irreducible, exterior element in regard to *noesis*. With this criticism, Merleau-Ponty tried to overcome the obstacles that historically prevented (empiricist and rationalist) philosophy to conceive a really mobile, embodied subject, whose movements are no longer seen as product of an external decision of "spirit."

The paper by Marcus Lutz Müller, "Sartre e a crise do fundamento," is an homage to his teacher Gerd Bornheim. One subject is the crisis of metaphysical foundations dealt with by Bornheim his *Sartre. Metafísica e Existencialismo*, published in 1971, but matured during his courses in Porto Alegre. Sartre is read by Bornheim in the perspective of Heidegger's history of Being, which makes explicit the consequences of Platonism and shows the way to the self-destruction of the West and to nihilism. Another topic is the accidental oblivion of Being treated by Bornheim in the book *Dialética. Teoria e Praxis*, edited in 1997. Lutz Müller shows that, according

to Bornheim, Sartre's humanism is one of the very last developments of the foundational crisis as identified by Heidegger.

There are two papers on Emmanuel Levinas. In "Da metamorfose da intencionalidade à metamorfose do sentido—Uma leitura de Levinas," Ricardo Timm de Souza seeks to show how Levinas's work, taken as a whole, brings about a reversal of sense of phenomenological intentionality by the introduction of the notion of "passive" or "nonintentional" consciousness, so as to operate a deeper, significant metamorphosis of philosophical activity as such, starting from the inquiry into the human question, as it is undertaken in his text "Humanism and An-archy."

Nythamar de Oliveira, in "Adeus: A epifania do Outro segundo Levinas," has a different objective. He revisits Levinas's conception of *à-Dieu* as a plausible account of a new way of saying (*dire*) the name of God (*Dieu*) without reducing its radical alterity to a mere dictum (*dit*). The Portuguese word "*adeus*" is perhaps the most felicitous way of doing justice to Levinas's radical subversion of onto-theology, as the hyphenated term (*a-deus*) also allows for an important ambiguity, beyond its own polysemy and plays on words, that not only one may think of the equivalent function of addressing the Other (*à Dieu*) and its negation by way of a privative alpha (*a-Dieu*) but also a tacit *il y a*.

Finally, Alfred Schutz is the main reference in "Necessidades Assistenciais de Mulheres Gestantes na Consulta de Enfermagem," by Penha Regina.V.L. Araújo and Florence Romijn Tocantins. They try to understand, in the light of the lived experiences, what the women's health care needs are when Nursing Consultation is sought. They opted for the phenomenological approach of Schutz's phenomenological sociology through an interview with the following guiding question: "What do you have in mind when you come for prenatal Nursing Consultation?" The comprehensive analysis of

statements of ten clients allowed them to build an idea of the needs of pregnant women who are requesting Nursing Consultation: they need to communicate with the health professional in order to know about pregnancy and the baby.

The study shows that dialogical conversation must be the starting point for a Nursing Consultation to be fully accomplished. Through dialogue, the clients indicate their “action project,” which can be understood as being their felt needs. It is shown that the fulfillment of the needs of the female clients who seek the prenatal Nursing Consultation should be directly linked to their way of life and to their care expectations. These include values, habits, and customs, befitting the nurse with an open attitude in relation to the situations experienced by that group. The nurse should establish a relationship in which the scientific knowledge and the health care protocols are interlinked with the client’s knowledge of life, because only by doing so, the two authors conclude, will she manage to provide the kind of care actually orientated towards the client as a person.

The articles collected in this volume may give the reader a living picture of some of the most vigorous and promising trends in this area of research in Portuguese-speaking Latin America.