ACHIEVEMENTS OF WINNICOTT'S REVOLUTION

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

This paper presents a perspective on Winnicott's revolutionary psychoanalytic theory and clinical practice, which results from more than 20 years of research. In this effort, I was greatly encouraged and helped by Elsa O. Dias and other members of the Brazilian Society for Winnicottian Psychoanalysis (SBPW).

The results have been presented in numerous publications in Portuguese and more recently also in other languages. All of them, along with some written by my associates, are now available on Internet, in the two journals of the SBPW and on e-books. I am happy to announce that Elsa Oliveira Dias's seminal book *Winnicott's theory of maturational processes* is forthcoming at Karnac.

This material forms the framework for the Training Course in Winnicottian Psychoanalysis offered at seven Winnicott Centers of the SBPW, most of which are members of the *International Winnicott Association* (IWA). It is also the backbone of the Training Course in Winnicottian Psychoanalysis, which Elsa O. Dias and I teach with other individual members of IWA. Moreover, it constitutes the theoretical foundation for discussions within the International

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Research Group on Winnicott's Paradigm, as well as for elaboration of the entries of the *Winnicott Dictionary*, a Project which the SBPW is about to initiate in collaboration with the IWA and with various psychoanalytic societies and universities, notably Unicamp and PUCPR.

**WINNICOTT'S PLEA FOR A REVOLUTION IN PSYCHOANALYSIS**

In the recently published draft of a 1970 paper, Winnicott wrote: "I am asking for a kind of revolution in our work. Let us re-examine what we do" (ABRAM, 2013, p. 312).

Winnicott understood that something was wrong with what psychoanalysts do. Now, what is it that they do? Traditionally, they try to solve certain kinds of health problems in their patients by interpreting the meaning of the verbal manifestations of their symptoms. They practice the Freudian talking cure.

But what is wrong with talking cure? The "common failure of many excellent analyses", that are based on it (ABRAM, 2013, p. 313). Patients feel that the analysis is never-ending, in other words, that it never solves their health problems. What is the reason for this common perception of lack of efficiency of ordinary analysis? Putting aside the inability of individual analysts, the talking cure does not enable the analyst to reach to the dissociation in the patient, which is "hidden in the material that is clearly related to repression taking place as a defence in a seemingly whole person" (ABRAM, 2013, p. 313).

The hidden material in question comprises affectively charged representational contents, which in consciousness represent censored instincts that were expelled from it. In the case
of a seemingly whole personality, repression is an internal defence. But defence against what? Specifically against dissociation in the personality. The reason why instinctual drives and related contents are internally repressed rather than managed is that the individual lacks the unified personality structure, which would allow him or her to integrate its various parts. The result may be more or less rigid defences, which repress one part or the other.

Breaking into the repressed unconscious contents does not put the analyst in contact with the dissociation, nor does it reveal the hidden function of the internal repression, the repression as a defence. Retrieving repressed contents does not help; the personality dissociation remains there. In order to be able to cure the patient, the analysts must be trained to deal specifically with dissociation. He or she must be able to see “and witness the parts that go to make the whole, a whole which does not exist except as viewed from outside”, because “the patient cannot do this work by himself” (ABRAM, 2013, p. 312). In order to become whole, all human beings depend on an adequate well-adapted environmental provision. This is what allows the lucky human baby to say: “When I look I am seen, so I exist. I can now afford to look and see” (WINNICOTT, 1971a, p. 134).

Winnicott illustrates his point by recalling what he learned from what I will call the FM case² (ABRAM, 2013, p. 315). FM was a middle-aged family man. He complained about his homosexuality. Before coming to Winnicott, he had undergone several orthodox Freudian analyses for a considerable time, but felt that they would never end (1989, p. 172). Winnicott noticed that there was a non-masculine element, which was dissociated from the masculine element in his personality. FM did not know this, and “none of his dozen analysts had been able to recognize the vital fact” (p. 315).

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² The case is described in Winnicott, 1989, chapter 28, previously published in 1971a, chapter 5.
Why was this? Most likely because they tried to account for his homosexuality in accordance with the traditional Freudian view, by reaching into the repressed sexual drives fixed on a specific erotogenic zone. This did not work. What enabled Winnicott to actually complete the analysis was the fact that, having stopped the “witch-hunt” for fixation points, he was able to see that this man “carried a girl around with him all his life” (p. 315), and thus, was able to unite him and this girl within himself. Winnicott said to FM: “I know perfectly well that you are a man but I am listening to a girl, and I am talking to a girl” (1989, p. 170). He then added: “The mad man is myself”. Thus, through his verbal behavior, Winnicott repeated the madness of FM’s mother, who had forced him to become a girl. Past madness became present in a symbolic manner. FM took advantage of this failure of the analyst. He said that now (being heard and talked to by Winnicott, that is, being held by him) he “felt sane in a mad environment”. Later on, FM added: “I myself could never say (knowing myself to be a man) ‘I am a girl’. I am not mad that way. But you have said it, and you have spoken to both parts of me” (1989, p. 171). By saying this, FM showed that he was aware that he was seen by Winnicott. He could now start to integrate his dissociated parts and begin to exist as a whole person.

Repression, according to this view, is not the main cause of mental disorders as is the case with Freudian psychoanalysis. Material related to repression is, as FM’s homosexuality, a hiding expedient. What then is the main cause of mental disorders? Environmental failure: something that is lacking or which jeopardizes the constitution of the whole person and that results in a dissociation or splitting.

We can thus understand why Winnicott asks for a revolution, not just for additions or conservative modifications, but for a radical change in psychoanalytic theory with regard to the nature and aetiology of disorders, as well as in psychoanalytic treatment
procedures. In the early 1950's, he had already clearly stated that the era of psychoanalysis limited to cases dominated by the problems of retrieving the repressed unconscious was "steadily drawing to a close" (1956, p. 291). Even in carefully chosen legitimate clinical cases, beneath the repressed unconscious, dissociation lurks, that is, a failure in the structure of personality. In order to remain effective as a clinical practice, psychoanalysis must change, and radically so.

In 1970, by deciding to plead for a revolution, despite being very ill, Winnicott was in fact inviting his colleagues to ponder the one he had already produced.

PSYCHOANALYTIC HEALTH PROBLEM-SOLVING AS SCIENTIFIC PROBLEM-SOLVING IN THE KUHNIAN SENSE

There can be no doubt that Winnicott conceived psychoanalytic health problem-solving as scientific problem-solving, that is, as an attempt to fill in gaps in our knowledge of the facts of life. In order to achieve this goal, psychoanalysts, like other scientists, must devise a "research program", execute it step by step, find the required solutions and, if these are inconclusive, be patient and try again. If the failures persist, the research program must be changed (1986, p. 14). Winnicott once wrote: "Mature adults bring vitality to that which is ancient, old, and orthodox by re-creating it after destroying it" (1965b, p. 94). If this is a correct reading of what Winnicott was doing, additional insight into his problem-solving activity can be gained through Kuhn's theory of the structure of scientific theories and scientific revolutions. The second, enlarged edition of Kuhn's
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was also published in 1970. It states that scientific theories are not put forward as true or nearly true world-views, but as research programs for specific areas, which guide the so-called “normal” research into unknown facts and their properties. If there is a significant surge of unsolved problems (or “anomalies”), a crisis arises, which is solved through “revolutionary” research, usually spearheaded by a young generation of practitioners of that particular discipline, aiming at producing a “paradigm shift”, which Kuhn compares to a Gestalt switch. The new paradigm is put forth as being more effective than the old one and as a new guideline for the normal problem-solving activity.

The FM case presented earlier can be seen as an anomaly within the Freudian paradigm; and Winnicott’s solution for it as the result of his revolutionary research.

My Kuhnian interpretation of what Winnicott was asking for in 1970 is in keeping with the views of several other authors, for instance, Greenberg and Mitchell.

We are suggesting that Kuhn’s approach to the development of scientific ideas and his definition of models as metaphysical commitments are highly applicable to the history of psychoanalytic thought and constitute a useful way to approaching different strategies of theory-construction (GREENBERG; MITCHELL, 1983, p. 19).

This nevertheless contradicts some well-known and widely accepted views. Thomas H. Ogden, for instance, claims that large parts of Winnicott’s writings can or have to be read as “non-fiction literature”, more precisely as “prose poems”, since they are strongly similar in nature to fictions by Borges and Frost, “resistant to paraphrase” and not intended to “arrive at conclusions”, but to “generate imaginative experience in the medium of language” (OGDEN, 2002, p. 206). While Ogden’s reading appeals to many, it nevertheless seems to me that the opposite is true. Winnicott quite
explicitly distinguishes the poetic truth, which comes with insight, from the scientific truth established methodically. The former is necessary in order not to lose sight of the human being as a whole; the latter is required for organizing human lives, which includes helping people through clinical practice. Poetry, like religion, philosophy and alchemy, does not provide the kind of knowledge which can be used for therapeutic purposes (1996, p. 237).

Charles Rycroft presents a different argument. He thinks that Winnicott's theorising remains "too idiosyncratic to be readily assimilated into the general body of any scientific theory" (1985, p. 144). Apparently, it did not occur to Rycroft to consider the possibility that Winnicott produced a scientific theory of human nature in its own right.

Jan Abram hesitates. In some passages, she subscribes to my thesis of the Winnicott's paradigm shift. In others, she adheres to Green's 1996 view that Winnicott "did not break off with Freud but rather completed his work" (2013, p. 326). Green himself hesitates. In 1975, he stated that Winnicott's contributions placed on the agenda of psychoanalysis a question regarding its future, which is still today often marred by outdated theoretical views and practices. Psychoanalysis shies away from the need to search for alternatives and renewal in the face of theoretical and practical impasses, from the need to extend its reach and to subject its concepts to radical changes, and from committing itself to self-criticism, as it used to be with Freud (GREEN, 1975/2013, p. 193). Yet, in 2011, while affirming that Winnicott was the author of a "developmental conception going further than Freud and Klein, both credible and sufficiently imaginative to gain general acceptance", he refrained from acknowledging the full measure of the distance so established.

This being so, the problem of determining Winnicott's place in the history of psychoanalysis is still open and awaiting further research.
WINNICOTT'S THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF WHOLE PERSONS

As I said, in 1970, Winnicott asked his colleagues to pay attention to a revolution that he had already produced. Of what did it consist? In my view, it consisted of Winnicott's own contributions to psychoanalysis, some of which are listed below:

1) a theory of the maturational process by which individuals become whole persons, the main element of which is integration;

2) a theory of interruptions of the maturational process, that is, Winnicott's theory of pathology, which includes a theory of the nature of the maturational disorders and their aetiology;

3) a theory of the clinical procedures for helping individuals to restart their interrupted process of maturation and thus achieve personal wholeness; and

4) a theory of cultural experience.

I shall start with Winnicott's theory of the maturational process, that is, of the constitution and structure of a human being as a whole. This is indeed the cornerstone of his thought; in Kuhnian-like terms, it is the main guiding generalization of his paradigm.

As we know, Freud's starting point is the stream of consciousness, which consists of mental states relating to subject-object relationships (the individual's sexual desire for objects in order to achieve sensuous pleasure) and it is produced naturally in the psychic apparatus as a manifestation of external excitements
and innate drives. By contrast, Winnicott’s view is not focused on the stream of consciousness but on human nature manifesting itself in time as a human being. A human being is a time sample of human nature, that is, the actualisation of the inherited tendency of human nature towards integration into a personal whole, together with physical growth and emotional as well as mental development. The process of integration is one of “agglomeration” and not of “object relating”. This is how Winnicott reads the philia of Empedocles: not as a Freudian “drive” or “instinct”, but as a love power that strives to put together and to keep together the primal particles or elements of the universe and of man (1989, p. 243). The outcome is personality structure and character formation, not a mental apparatus. At the beginning, the maturational process is absolutely dependent on there being a facilitating environment. This dependence fades away as years go by but never vanishes completely. The Freudian subject-object relationships in search of pleasure do not belong to the initial stages of the maturational process; they only occur at a later stage, if at all, and not automatically, as Freud thought, but only if the individual has previously received the needed environmental provision.

When duly facilitated by ever expanding environments, the integration process passes through several stages. The first few are dual: the stage of the first theoretical feed, of transitional phenomena, of the I AM and of concern; the next ones are triangular (belonging to family life); and all of the following are multilateral, taking place in family groups, adolescent groups, relationships within societies, and, finally, in total behaviour in relation to humankind, human history and cultural tradition in general.

If anyone asks for a good example of Winnicott’s paradigm shift, I usually focus on his theory of the maturational process, but there are evidently various other examples: his theory of pathology.
his treatment procedures and his theory of cultural experience, which shall be presented below.

INTERRUPTIONS OF THE PROCESS OF INTEGRATION: NATURE OF MATURATIONAL TROUBLES, AETIOLOGY AND REACTIONS (DEFENCES)

Freud’s theory of psychic illnesses is well known. He observed gaps in the stream of consciousness due to the elimination of affective and representational mental states, which were felt to be psychologically unbearable or morally and socially reprehensible. Their elimination from consciousness is explained in terms of repression from within the individual (ego, superego) and/or from the outside (morality, social pressure). Kept in the unconscious, these states have enough strength for a return to consciousness, which they do through the workings of the unconscious machinery of the mind. In this way, they become symptoms, which in turn are additional painful disorders in the stream of consciousness. The essence of the Freudian pathology is repression: the actual elimination of the censored mental states, which then, come back in a disorderly and disturbing manner.

Winnicott maintains a very different stance. For him, the disorders do not concern the elimination of what is there yet should not be, but rather the lack of integration of what had to be put together although was not. Something should have happened yet did not, and this is different from something which did happen but which should not have happened.

During the stage of the first theoretical feed (first dual relationships), individuals may suffer from unthinkable agonies.
specifically, the painful struggle of a weakened tendency towards integration ("weak ego", "weakened ego") into a unity (I AM). The aetiology is the lack of holding, handling and object-presenting. Defences consist of a variety of psychoses, such as active disintegration, infantile schizophrenia, false self, psychosomatic illnesses, "primary narcissism" and self-phenomena.

Later on, during the stage of the transitional phenomena, the main problem is the lack of trust in the environment. This is mainly due to a lack of attention by the mother and her absence for periods longer than what is tolerable for very fragile "ego defences". New defences become necessary and they include the baby stopping the activity of playing and clinging to the mother (for instance, using her body as transitional object).

During the stage of concern, the trouble lies in doubts about excited states elaborated and experienced as loving and hating, as good and bad, as well as doubts about relating to the corresponding good and bad objects. For example, it could be doubts about the next feed tomorrow. The benign circle of taking and giving breaking off, with both object-mother and environment-mother, is the paradigmatic impingement on integration. The defence is a reactive depression and an inhibition or severe damage to the instinctual relationship with the mother. The outcome shows up as lack of capacity for loving and hating, absence of ambivalence, and therefore, absence of the capacity for depression, of the sense of guilt and of the sense of responsibility. In triangular relationships with the genital backing, the maturational trouble comes from an intolerable ambivalence of loving and hating the same person – the father (by the boy) or the mother (by the girl). This stems from an immaturity in the child, whose fantasies overlap with reality. There is internal conflict (which is not a doubt) regarding what to do. The child is troubled again, as in the stage of concern, by the problem of integrating
opposite feelings, the difference being that, this time, the feelings relate to sexual drives and not to digestion. The specific castration threat in the Freudian sense is not a decisive factor. Two types of defences against the conflict are possible: regression (dropping of maturational achievements), or repression, which results in different varieties of neurosis (rigidity of psychoneurotic defence organizations). The origin of the child's failure to avoid neurosis lies in "developmental failures at earlier stages" (1989, p. 71). Indeed, "pure" cases of neurosis are uncommon, and might not exist at all. In this stage, as during the stage of concern, repression is a defence against the lack of personal cohesion. Another important implication is that, contrary to what Freud said, not only psychoses but also neuroses can be prevented by trying "to give to the child what is needed in the earliest stages of infancy, where there is great dependence" (1958, p. 319; cf. 1988, p. 38 and 1965a, p. 67). In infancy or at any age, if the previously good environment is lost and the individual is mature enough to be aware of the fact that the environment is responsible for the loss, the result is a "deprivation". The defence against this kind of interruption of the maturational process is the antisocial tendency, which must be seen as the individual's effort to recover what was lost and as a sign of hope. Character disorders are personality distortions which arise when the individual needs to accommodate some degree of antisocial tendency with other kinds of problems hidden in them, which could be a psycho-neurosis (a conflict in the individual's personal unconscious) or a variety of psychosis (1984, p. 245).

During adolescence, individuals are naturally drawn away from the family environment, no matter how good it is, and tend to relate to a much larger environment, to society in the more broad sense. The effect is isolation and the reemergence of very early problems concerning the establishment of relationships with the external world. Among the defences, we find group identifications,
instability, and all kinds of quasi-psychotic symptoms, antisocial
tendency, but not neurosis, which is felt by the adolescent to be a
false solution.

Maturational problems in social life are related to the capacity
to tolerate ambivalence and feelings of deprivation. Disturbing
factors in social life are social tensions and the lack or loss of social
provision. Defences consist of the renewal of antisocial tendencies,
the building of walls between communities and nations, wars and a
yearning for dictatorships.

In essence, Winnicott thoroughly modified psychoanalytic
pathology:

1) Disorders are *interruptions* in the continuity of being,
   that is, in the relations with the environment or with
   other persons, and not gaps or cuts in the stream of
   consciousness.

2) The origin (aetiology) of the disorders are in the
   first place *environmental failures*, a lack of the needed
   environmental provision, and, in the second, reactions
   to those failures, as well as personal doubts and internal
   conflicts which endanger the process of integration, and
   not castration threats of physical mutilation (destruction
   of the sexual potential).

3) *Defences* are essentially renewed attempts at self-organi-
   zation, which reveal themselves insufficient, since they
   are unaided; they are not symptoms of unsuccessful at-
   tempts to compensate for frustrations.
TREATMENT OF DISTURBANCES IN THE PROCESS OF INTEGRATION

Freudian troubles are meant to be cured by reconnecting the symptoms with the corresponding repressed unconscious contents through interpretation, therefore, retrieving the latter from the unconscious to the conscious memory system of affects and representations. However, since repressive instances are always present, the thwarting of desires and the disturbances of consciousness are repeatedly reinitiated, so that the treatment never comes to an end.

Having modified psychoanalytic pathology in a revolutionary way, Winnicott changed the psychoanalytic treatment procedures accordingly. When halted, the tendency towards integration builds up into a powerful force to resume integration towards health. This is an essential part of Winnicott's theory of integration. If the environment provides an opportunity, the whole process will promptly resume within the individual.

The main aim of the treatment is to help with the dynamics of the cure, the urge to cure, based on a belief in human nature and its tendency towards integration, a belief that the maturational process will resume and eventually integrate the personality into a whole.

For this purpose, the general task is to provide care for unattended integration needs according to the stage of the disturbance in the ways indicated below:

This reminds me of Balint's concept of the new beginning. The differences are that Balint works with love relationships, Winnicott with environmental integration. Balint understands the need for environmental provision, but integration of the integration processes.
• In the case of failures in the personality structure (psychotic disorders): by giving the opportunity (i.e. the availability of a reliable specialised environment, the analyst) for the regression to dependence. It makes possible for the patient to experience, for the first time, the feared state of breakdown that happened but was not experienced, and which is the source of unthinkable agonies and of the madness itself.

• In the case of depressions caused by doubts about good and bad and by ambivalence related to digestion: by giving the opportunity to recover from doubts through interpreting, rehabilitating and being patient.

• In the case of neuroses due to conflicts in triangular relationships among whole persons, with genital backing: by interpretation in view of distinguishing fantasy from reality and reliable presence. Since "pure" cases of neurosis are uncommon, the analyst must be prepared to allow for the appearance of hidden failures in the personality structure, treating them as such and not as cases of resistance.

• In the case of antisocial tendency due to deprivation (loss of a previous good environment): by management in the traditional setting or in the amplified setting (family, groups, schools).

• In the case of character disorders: by dissection down to the hidden illness and confrontation with the antisocial problems as such (1984, p. 247).

• In the case of adolescent doldrums: by being there, understanding and waiting.
The recovery of personality structures might not be final at any point of the treatment, just as the initial constitution is never final either. However, recovery once started may be expected to tend towards progress, with the troublesome breakdowns of whatever nature losing their strength and becoming less threatening. If this does not happen, there could be supervening physical causes. The analyst may not be good enough or may have made serious mistakes. Once again, Winnicott’s perspective on the therapeutic efficiency of psychoanalysis diverges significantly from Freud’s.

Winnicott’s care procedures may also be applied to social tensions, such as instability of the social system, renewed anti-social tendency leading to dictatorships or to anarchy, building of walls (both internal to societies and external) and wars (civil, international or even global). The recommend interventions are respectively:

1) Efforts to ensure the presence of 30% of healthy citizens, who do not behave like adolescents;

2) Helping with cross-identifications and the supporting of democratic tendencies by explaining its nature and the rationale of the democratic machinery;

3) Aiding with the internalization of the divisions, that is, seeing ourselves in our opponents and tolerating them based on the capacity for tolerating ambivalence;

4) Explaining the aims of wars: victory (military, not moral), re-establishment of the democratic machinery, welcoming of the mature elements in enemy countries without any allocation of war guilt (1986, p. 219-220).

Finally, there may also be troubles with what Winnicott calls the individual’s total behaviour, which is about preserving
and recreating cultural traditions, both locally and universally. For example, each one of us is challenged by the objectification process (science, morality founded on laws, religions based on dogmas and rituals), which, nowadays, is becoming dominant and exclusive on the global scale, and thus, threatening our personal relationships and civilization as we know it. Insofar as it interrupts the continuity of existence of a world in which things are not technical artifacts, and where good deeds are not just realizations of moral or religious commands, but have meaning, majesty and mystery. It was given to them by us, allowing for the poetry in all of us and for the protection of places where serenity can be found (1986, p. 208 and 233).

WINNICOTT’S PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OF SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS AND OF CULTURAL EXPERIENCE

For Freud, social order, morality, religion, arts and all other abstract cultural activities are products of the sublimation of objects of instincts, mainly of a sexual nature, and of the aims of instincts. This process is a development of individuals and social groups, caused by the inevitable conflict related to sexual objects among parents and children. In today’s families, this is a conflict between the actual father and his sons regarding the mother. Among primitive hordes, as Freud’s mythology would have it, it was the rivalry between a violent, jealous and inflexible father and all of his sons regarding the females of the horde. In both situations, the father is pushed irresistibly by his own libido to defend his sexual object, or objects, and does so by threatening, or even specifically eliminating, the sexual potential of his rivals through castration. In
both cases, castration is inevitably resisted and individuals cannot
but try to protect their sexual capacity, with the father, who is valued
and loved because of his protection, strength and sexual potential,
becoming an object of hate, rebellion or even crime. The unavoidable
outcome is the ambivalence of the son and the group of sons towards
the father, implying a feeling of guilt. Since castration threats
go on relentlessly due to the very nature of the conflict, the only
definitive way out of this ambivalence is the submission of the sons
to the will of the father; otherwise, the struggle between males for
sexual objects restarts with similar consequences. This means that
castration, in the sense of renunciation of the original sexual object
or objects, is accepted and introjected. From then on, it becomes
part of the individual's unconscious as well as of the collective
archaic heritage, which is present in each individual and accounts
for the strength, inflexible character and persistence of the threat of
castration (FREUD, 1912-13). Insofar as they inevitably resist this treat,
humans are always guilty, and the only way to deal with this guilt is
to engage obsessively in the process of sublimation. Social order and
human culture is thus nothing more than an inevitable outcome of
sexual conflicts (Freud remains entirely faithful to determinism in
his theory of culture), essentially with the same properties as those
of obsessive individuals and collective neuroses; indeed, they are
merely symptoms, albeit less severe ones than those of neurotics.
Social life and culture provide for the reduction of conflicts, but the
pleasure so achieved is never fully satisfying; the renunciation of
instinctual objects must go on forever. The repressive instances are
unforgiving.

For Winnicott, the cultural landscape is quite different. The
family is created by the child and is the meeting point between the
child's integration needs and parental care (1965b, p. 49). The struc-
ture of the family emerges in the stage of concern, "to a large extent
out of the tendency towards organization in the individual personality" (1965b, p. VII). The father protecting the mother at this stage makes it possible for the child to bear the guilt of his excited use of the mother and to be free to love her instinctively, his instincts being initially not genital but related to digestion (1988, p. 79). The origin and the initial functioning of the family, of the mother and the father, has to do with environmental provision of the kind needed by the child at the stage of concern. In addition, it has nothing to do with the sexual rivalry between son and father or with father's threats of castration, son's rebellion or social interest in exogamy. Freud has simply failed to take account of the essential aspects of the first natural social group.

Concerning the origins of morality, the basic elements are also acquired during the stage of concern. The child changes from "pre-ruth" to "ruth" and becomes gradually more concerned about the damage, which he feels he is inflicting on his beloved mother in the excited relationship. If the mother survives and does not retaliate, which she may be able to do if she is healthy and is assisted by the father or by someone else, the result is that the child discovers "his own personal urge to give and to construct and to mend" (1958, p. 206). In this way, the child creates his or her sense of guilt and of responsibility for other people, which is the very basis of ethics, albeit evidently not of the ethics of law, and certainly not of the law that forbids incest, but of the ethics of caring for other people's existence.

With regard to religion, its different forms correspond to successive stages of the maturational process. Monotheism notably has its origin in the stage of I AM, when the father is used by the child as a blueprint for acquiring personal unity in the family environment. Freud's Oedipal derivation of monotheism, both in its ontogenetic (an individual's Oedipal situation) and in his phylogenetic version (the primitive horde conditions), is simply ignored.
Artistic activity is the continuation of playing, which starts during the stage of transitional phenomena. Playing is inherently exciting and precarious, but it does not derive (in its characteristic form) from any instinctual arousal at all. In particular, it is not, as it is for Freud, an outcome of the sublimation of repression which solves internal conflicts (1912-13, p. 366).

Finally, there is the question of the value of human civilization. Freud puts a lot of weight on the "higher values" created by cultural development as a result of the sublimation of original instinctual objects and aims, values related to "scientific, artistic and ideological psychic activities" (1930, p. 227) and to all our "spiritual" activities in general.

Again, Winnicott views things differently. The initial values are concrete human beings for whom we feel responsible, and the highest value is the "personal fulfillment" in a healthy society (capable of providing stability and mechanisms necessary for social integration) of healthy individuals (capable of acting in responsible ways, of cooperating and of cross identifying with others) (1986, p. 153; cf. p. 237). The activities which Freud is contemplating are abstract products of the mind or the spirit (in German: Geist) or the intellect. According to Winnicott, human existence is psychosomatic, and the mind is not a higher entity, it is not an entity at all, but a "special case of the functioning of the psyche-soma". "separated out from the psyche part of the psyche-soma" (1958, p. 244). When this functioning becomes merely "psychological" without contacting the psyche-soma, which seems to be the case in higher cultural activities, it often develops into a false entity that is the basis of the false self. The false self is indeed a distorted formation of the personal unity due to an environmental failure in the early stages, which lives on only through a mind or intellect (1989, p. 467). Cultural activities insofar as they are products of a split off mind are anything but personally valuable,
they are defensive and therefore, strictly pathological. This is true at
the individual level—brilliant minds are often aspects of personally
failed individuals—but also at the social level—collective abstract
products may be highly problematic.

Indeed, we know today that the higher spiritual activities
of the Freudian kind can seriously endanger human civilization.
In recent centuries, science has produced an objectification of
the world and of human beings, which is the basis for modern
technology. One increasingly feels that technology is getting out
of control and is putting in danger not only civilization as we know
it but even the place of the human species in the world. Research
into artificial intelligence and artificial life can hardly be treated as
an activity that produces “higher values”. Instead, it serves a power,
which carries with it and imposes upon us quite different new values,
which we may not appreciate at all. Nowadays, artistic activities
are in many cases difficult to distinguish from entertainment and
show business, with some serious groups of artists proclaiming the
death of art. As we know all too well, ideologies of right and left
have led to unprecedented criminal activities of global proportions.
The possibility that criminal ideologies may become based on
technology, a phenomenon first observed in Communist and Nazi
dictatorships, but which seems to be creeping into our current
technology within democratic societies, entails prospects which
some of us may find very bleak.

It appears that Freud was still in the grip of the Illuminist ideal
of perfectibility of human kind through a process of rationalization
under the dictatorship of theoretical and practical reason, both of
which he believed to be inevitable and welcome sublimations of
the primitive father’s castration threats and practices. For some
of us today, this rosy dream has turned into a dark nightmare.
What Freud considered as the three main narcissistic wounds of
humanity (the substitution of the Earth for the Sun as the center of our planetary system, the descent of man from animal ancestors and the supremacy of the unconscious over the consciousness), are mere bagatelles compared with the three other wounds recently spelled out by Sloterdijk, which are: the progressive and apparently unstoppable destruction of planet Earth (its ecological systems), the substitution of human beings by inanimate computer systems and robots in information processing and industrial production, and the dissolution of human creativity, love relationships, and even liberty into mechanical reflexive technologies, computer therapies, and power games in all areas of traditional human activity (SLOTERDIJK, 2001, p. 345).

Winnicott was well aware of these dangers. In 1969, as Americans landed on the Moon and planted a flag on it, he wrote that the only way of recovering from this destruction of the Moon as an illogical thing up there in the skies, alive in its active beauty and which meant so much to us when we knew what dark and light meant, indeed the only hope for our civilization, would be if we managed to work out the logical side together with the illogical side and to integrate the scientist in us with the poet in us (1986, p. 197, 207-208). Once again, this is not a question of sublimation but of integration on a global and historical level.

**FINAL REMARKS**

In the light of what I have presented, I would like to make a final remark regarding Winnicott’s place in the history of psychoanalysis. He is neither a Freudian nor a Kleinian. Instead, he is what he became by living his life and doing his job as a clinical practitioner dedicated to helping others to become integrated
individuals and to engage in the "practice of living" creatively. This now allows us to choose to be Winnicottians in our own right.

Winnicott based his problem-solving activity on a new view of human beings, set forth in terms of a theory of human nature and of its actualization in human environments and interpersonal relationships, not on a theory of repressed unconscious constituted of representations charged by affects and a mental apparatus which operates on these mental states in a mechanical way without conscious control. Thus, he switched from psychology to anthropology, in the original Kantian sense of a theory of the modification of human nature not by rules of theoretical and practical reason but by pragmatic knowledge gathered through observation of human behaviour and character and, in some degree, through knowledge of world history and through reading biographies and even plays and novels.

Winnicott's pathology is essentially about the "problem of existing" (1965b, p. 79; cf. p. 61), not about symptoms that replace the original objects of drives that are mostly sexual. Life, says Winnicott, is more about being than about sex (1986, p. 35).

Winnicott's clinical procedures are ways of providing for failures in the process of integration of individuals into personal units that render them capable of relating to increasingly complex environments, and not just of retrieving the representational elements expelled from the stream of consciousness and kept repressed.

Winnicott has produced an original theory of cultural experience, a phenomenon which has no place in the Freudian description of the mental apparatus, which proved itself a completely new perspective on the origin and nature of social order and of culture, including morality, religion, art and science.

In keeping with my Kuhnian interpretation, I want to emphasize that Winnicott did not offer us a final theory of the
processes of integration, nor the complete set of procedures for solving integration problems, but a scientific research programme. This program has significantly increased the problem-solving capacity of psychoanalysis, and is meant to be used in studying time samples of human nature, that is, human beings who have been successfully integrated, as well as others who are less fortunate and who are in need of the treatment for their weaknesses. It can also be applied for the study of non-clinical subject matters such as social life and culture.

Finally, Winnicott's restatement of psychoanalysis as a clinically efficient anthropology with its own subject matter, human nature, on one hand, can be reconciled with the contemporary philosophy of language (Wittgenstein), as well as with the philosophy of human existence (Heidegger). On the other hand, it successfully resist the claims of much greater efficiency and even of exclusiveness put forward by some clinical theories and practices of today, such as the behavioral-cognitive, the medical (drug-based), and one which relies on neuroscience.

REFERENCES


