1770, by proving that a possible object must satisfy the conditions concerning to pure intuitions as well as to categories. By demonstrating the validity of categories, Kant bring forward the thesis of transcendental semantics that in 1781-7 is formulated in this terms: “it is requisite that abstract concept be made sensible, that is, that an object corresponding to it in intuition be forthcoming, otherwise the concept remains, as we say, without sense, that is, without meaning” (A 240; B 299).

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Criticism and semantics

This paper starts by showing that the Kantian program of the critique of pure reason can be summed up in the following question: how theoretical synthetic a priori judgments are possible? Considered by Kant as the “general” or the “main” task of transcendental philosophy, this question requires the determination of conditions in which judgments of this kind, philosophic as well as scientific, are objectively valid. In modern language, it is required to ensure the meaning of theoretical a priori terms and the truth conditions of theoretical synthetic a priori judgments in the domain of interpretation constituted by objects of possible representational experience. Accordingly, Kant’s transcendental logic, which is the initial form of his transcendental philosophy, can be interpreted as being, in essence, an a priori theory of meaning and truth, that is, as an a priori semantics. In its second part, the paper studies the different ways in which Kant extended this program of the critique of pure reason to a priori judgments belonging to non theoretic domains of philosophical discourse. It shows, in a schematic manner, how are raised and answered questions about the possibility of synthetic judgments a priori of morals, esthetics, of law, of the doctrine of virtue and of history, especial attention being given to the multiplicity of domains of interpretation and the subsequent modification of the concept of objective validity. These considerations provide conclusive evidence that transcendental semantics of synthetic a priori judgments in general is an essential component of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, taken not just as a transcendental logic, but in the amplified sense as the whole of results obtained by Kant in the course of his progressive extension of his program of the critique of pure reason.